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Article 2

HOMOPHOBIA: IN THE CLOSET AND IN
THE COFFIN
Amy D. Ronner"

INTRODUCTION
One of Lord Alfred Douglas' poems, "Two Loves," that was
quoted at Oscar Wilde's trial for homosexual offenses, ends:
...
"Sweet youth,
Tell me why, said and sighing, thou dost rove
These pleasant realms? I pray thee speak me sooth
What is thy name?" He said, "My name is Love."
Then straight the first did turn himself to me
And cried, "He lieth, for his name is Shame,
But I am Love, and I was wont to be
Alone in this fair garden, till he came
Unasked by night; I am true Love, I fill
The hearts of boy and girl with mutual flame."
Then sighing, said the other, "Have thy will,
I am the Love that dare not speak its name."'
In the Twentieth Century, "the Love that dare not speak its
name" became synonymous with gay love. 2 In fact, that line and
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. J.D., 1985,
University of Miami; Ph.D., 1980, University of Michigan; M.A., 1975, University of
Michigan; B.A., 1975, Beloit College. I dedicate this article to the University of
Miami Law School Dean, Dennis 0. Lynch, who has helped me and so many others
self-actualize. I would like to extend special appreciation to Terry J. Barnett of the
law firm Rumbaugh, Rideout & Barnett in Tacoma, Washington. Mr. Barnett did a
superb job representing Frank Vasquez in the Vasquez v. Hawthorne case, which is
discussed in this article, and he also generously gave me his time and the benefit of
his perspective. I am also grateful to my research assistants, Dennis O'Connor and
Denise Christie.
1. Lord Alfred Douglas, Two Loves, in THE CHAMELEON
(December 1894), available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/poemsofdouglas.htm.
2. In 1894, John Francis Bloxam, a homosexual Oxford graduate, asked Lord
Alfred Douglas to contribute some poems for the new periodical, THE CHAMELEON.
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the intimacy between Douglas and Wilde share an important
theme - secrecy. Wilde described Douglas, also known as "Bosie,"
as someone who "understands me and my art, and loves both," and
said, "I hope never to be separated from him." 3 Despite their bond,
however, Douglas abandoned Wilde during his trial, absconding to
France to avoid being called as a witness. 4 For him, secrecy
trumped love.
In Wilde's era, secrecy was the recipe for gay survival. At
that time, being open and honest about one's homosexuality could
mean not mere ostracism, but also, as Wilde himself learned,
incarceration. 5 While today most gay couples view secrecy as an
option, not as a mandate, lamentably, there are still drawbacks to
6
going public with one's sexual orientation.
7
It is this author's broad thesis that judicial homophobia
encourages invisibility for gay and lesbian couples and that this is
psychologically, politically, and culturally damaging. In fact,
judicial decisions can and do perpetuate discrimination against
lesbians and gays and promote cruel stereotypes.8 While most
See
The
Knitting
Circle,
Lord
Alfred
Bruce
Douglas
at
http://www.sbu.ac.uk/stafflag/alfreddouglas.html.
Douglas's two poems were
quoted at Oscar Wilde's 1895 trial for homosexual offenses. Id. The last line of
Two Loves may have its roots in the 1876 parliament in which Robert Peel
employed the expression, "interChristianosnon nomindum," or the crime that dare
not be named by Christians. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. Apparently, Lord Alfred Douglas believed that had he testified at
Wilde's trial, he could have saved his dear friend. See id.
5. See id. Oscar Wilde spent some time in prison, after which he and Lord
Douglas continued their friendship. Id.
6. See infra notes 26-35 and the accompanying text (discussing process of
emerging from the closet). See also infra notes 26-62 (discussing some of the
drawbacks of "coming out" in the context of wills).
7. Homophobia has been defined as "an irrationally negative attitude toward
[homosexual people]." Richard C. Friedman & Jennifer I. Downey, Homosexuality,
333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 923, 924 (1994). See also Jack M. Battaglia, Religion,
Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and AntiDiscriminationLaws, 76 U. DET. MERcY L. REV. 189, 195-96 (1999) ("The more
extreme manifestations of homophobia include verbal abuse, harassment, and
physical violence. Although negative attitudes toward gay people can be connected
to religious beliefs, their connection is fluid and complex."); Gregory M. Herek, The
Social Pyschology of Homophobica Toward A PracticalTheory, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 923, 929 (1986) (stating that homophobic attitudes give people a way
of "avoid[ing] anxiety associated with unacceptable parts of themselves"); Amy D.
Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the JudicialPerpetuationof
DamagingStereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 341, 342 (1995) [hereinafter Bottoms]
('When courts face cases involving the rights of lesbians and gay men, they too
frequently experience anxiety and react by portraying the homosexual as a symbol
of something they believe is comfortingly antithetical to themselves.").
8. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denialof "In the Home" in Bowers
v. Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objectives Correlatives and The Bacchae as
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areas of the law harbor bias against same-sex couples, one
especially inhospitable niche is trusts and estates. 9
This article explores how homophobic trusts and estates
decisions can psychologically damage same-sex couples and harm
society at large. Part I explores the ligature between the closet
and the coffin. It initially discusses how emergence from the closet
can benefit individuals, facilitate gay and lesbian political activity,
and help combat homosexual bias.' 0 Then, bringing in some key
concepts of estate planning, Part I describes how same-sex couples
Specifically, a
can present special challenges for lawyers."
couple's openness with respect to their sexual orientation can
encourage a will contest and result in the invalidation of the will.
However, a life in the closet can do the same thing - engender
litigation between the decedent's family members and the
homosexual beneficiary. 12
Part II shifts from wills to intestacy. One of the main goals
behind probate codes is bestowing upon testators the freedom to
dispose of their property in any manner they wish. 13 Intestacy law
applies this principle to situations where there is no will by aiming
to accomplish by statute a default plan based on the presumed
donative intent of the typical testator. 14 All such statutes have
protections for a surviving spouse. 15 With respect to these, the
approach tends to be cut and dry, depending on the answer to one
question alone: is the couple legally married? If the answer is no,
spousal protections usually do not apply.
Because there are increasing numbers of people living
together outside of the constriction of marriage, courts have begun
Such courts have
to depart from the traditional approach.
Tools for Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263 (1996)
(discussing judicial homophobia) [hereinafter Amathia]; Bottoms, supra note 8
(discussing how courts create a mythic image of the homosexual, which is an
amalgam of all of the preconceptions that underlie the usual justification that
courts give for denying rights to a lesbian or gay male); Amy D. Ronner, Scouting
for Intolerance: The Dale Court's Resurrection of the Medieval Leper, 11 LAW &
SEXUALITY 53 (2002) [hereinafter Scouting] (exploring how courts have treated
homosexuals as "unclean" lepers who can infect youth and endanger the
community).
9. See infra notes 26-62 and accompanying text (discussing will contests in the
context of same-sex couples and the effect of secrecy on such estate plans).
10. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing the intestate share
of surviving spouses and the elective share in some states).
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developed concepts, like that of the meretricious relationship
doctrine, that entail the examination of the characteristics of the
Such an approach, designed to
individual relationship. 16
accommodate change, gives the law greater flexibility and
fairness.
It is here that the discussion hones in on the decision,
Vasquez v. Hawthorne,17 from the state of Washington, in which a
homosexual life-partner filed a claim against his lover's intestate
estate, seeking a share of the community property.' 8 The Vasquez
decision, in which the appellate court determined that a same-sex
relationship cannot be marital-like as a matter of law,' 9 serves as
an example of typical judicial homophobia. 20 The court derogated
significant policies underlying intestacy law, trampled upon
precedent, dehumanized homosexuals by divesting them of the
power to choose, and effectually created a disincentive for such
individuals to emerge from the closet. 21 Although the state
supreme court reversed, 22 even that decision did not go far
enough. 23 In fact, the supreme court majority and concurring
decisions harbor anti-gay sentiment and promote the same
damaging anti-gay stereotypes that surfaced in the decision below.
The last part of this article sums up the harmful effects of
decisions like Vasquez, and describes the real wound that
homophobia inflicts. Ultimately returning to Bosie's poem, "Two
Loves," 24 and its renowned coda, this article endorses laws that
invite gay and lesbian couples to be open about their bonds and
25
bring about a world where "Love will dare speak its name."
I. THE CLOSET AND THE COFFIN
As one scholar has put it, "the 'closet' has become the
prevailing metaphor to symbolize the invisibility of gay, lesbian,
16. See infra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the
meretricious relationship doctrine in Washington, a progressive community
property state).
17. 994 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), reversed and vacated by 33 P.3d 735
See infra notes 157-202 and accompanying text (discussing
(Wash. 2000).
Vasquez).
18. See Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 241.
19. See id.
20. See infra notes 26-35.
21. See infra notes 200-320 (analyzing the decision's homophobia).
22. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 735.
23. See infra notes 203-335 and accompanying text (analyzing the state supreme
court's homophobia).
24. Lord Alfred Douglas, supra note 1.
25. See infra notes 350-351 and accompanying text.
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bisexual and transgendered individuals."26 Because segments of
society stigmatize same-sex unions, emergence from the closet is
courageous and significant. Such disavowing of invisibility brings
real psychological benefits. Because being in the closet can be an
internalization of societal homophobia or an acceptance of one's
sexual identity as something shameful, coming out can exorcize
the negativity and elevate self-esteem. 27 Also, because there is
something dark and tragic about a life lived in secrecy, one in
which individuals cannot be honest about who they are, coming
28
out can breed self-actualization and happiness.
Coming out of the closet can be both cathartic and selfaffirming. It is a means of divesting oneself of societal scorn and
figuratively marching into the world chanting, "I am proud of who
I am." 29 But beyond that, coming out is not just a choice to make
public one's true identity, but it can be - for the homosexual - the
very rite of passage of becoming gay or lesbian. 30 In short, the
26. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech,
and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 120-21 (1998) C'Due to
societal homphobia and heterosexism, which act in tandem with patriarchy, white
supremacy, and class stratification, gay and lesbian experience is often shrouded in
secrecy."). See also Kathleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private
Lives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1531, 1545 (1995) C'[S]odomy statutes reinforce self-doubt,
solitude, and anxiety about remaining closet-bound lest one be branded a criminal.
It appears that gay men and lesbian women are forced to peer out from this the
closet because the law has backed them into it."); Scouting, supra note 8, at 65
("Given the numerous common denominators between the treatment of
homosexuals and lepers, it is not surprising that gays and lesbians, like those
infected with the dreaded disease, sometimes respond by hiding.").
27. See Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 120-21. Hutchinson states that "[a]
plethora of psychological data has documented the debilitating impact that
'internalized homophobia - or the acceptance of societal homophobia by gay and
lesbian people - has upon an individual's self-esteem, personal development, and
emotional adjustment." Id. at 121.
28. See id. at 120-23.
29. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557 (1995), the Supreme Court found that forcing the operators of the St.
Patrick's Day parade to include the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
would violate free speech. See id. With respect to outness, Hurley was a damaging
case. Souter, to his credit, recognized that marching in the parade was a form of
"coming out," a way for individuals to "celebrate [their] identity as openly gay,
lesbian and bisexual ... [and] to show that there are such individuals in the
community." Id. at 570. See Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 116 (arguing that by
allowing the parade organizers to prevent GLIB from such open celebration, the
Hurley court "relegated 'outness' back into its metaphorical closet"); Scouting,
supra note 8, at 22-24, 53-54 (analyzing Hurley as both "homophobic and
questionable"). See also Bryan H. Wildenthal, To Say 'I Do: Shahar v. Bowers,
Same-Sex Marriage,and Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
381, 453 (1998) (footnotes omitted) ("Justice Souter's opinion validated, as lying at
the core of First Amendment protection, speech that - even though sometimes 'not
wholly articulate' - proclaims the innermost identity of the speaker.").
30. See Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 123 ('Because coming out serves as a
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process of coming out is identity. 31
There is more to coming out of the closet than individual
psychological well being. As several scholars have noted, for
homosexuals, "the coming out process has tremendous cultural
and political significance." 32
Coming out is politically
advantageous because it lets homosexuals unite to achieve
equality.3 3 But there is more to it than just the facilitation of gay
and lesbian collective political activity. The concealment of samesex orientation from public awareness retards progress for
lesbians and gay individuals.3 4 People who are familiar and
interact with homosexuals are less inclined to harbor homophobic
beliefs. 35
Consequently, openness with respect to sexual
orientation can alter attitudes.
There is a definite ligature between the closet and the
coffin. For homosexuals engaged in estate planning, their
willingness to be open about their sexual orientation can not only
affect the way they set up the disposition of their property at
death, but also can determine the post-mortem aftermath.3 6 To
crucial instrument in the development of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
identities, 'outness' has become an inseparable part of gay identity.").
31. See id. at 123.
32. See id. at 89.
33. See id. at 120-21. Hutchinson explains:
[The closet harms gay communities because it hinders the ability of gays
and lesbians to engage in collective political action to achieve equality.
Furthermore ...homophobia and gay and lesbian invisibility also divide
communities of color and feminist communities, erecting barriers to social
and political action in these social groups as well.
Id. at 121. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives,46 STAN. L. REV.
607, 614 (1994) ("asserting that speaking out in the form of 'gaylegal narratives'
has the effect of "emphasiz[ing] that we are here, there, and everywhere...");
Wildenthal, supra note 29, at 454 ('It is through 'coming out' - a quintessential
speech act - that gay people identify themselves" and "[flor gay people, speech has
been, if anything, an even more important device for social change than it has been
for other minority groups who have taken advantage of American liberty to press
America toward greater justice.").
34. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 614 ('Psychological studies suggest that
people who actually know an openly lesbian or gay person are less likely to be
homophobic or to accept homophobic stereotypes."). See also Rachel A. Van Cleave,
Advancing Tolerance and Equality Using State Constitutions: Are the Boy Scouts
Prepared?,29 STETSON L. REV. 237, 241 (1999) ("The law's approval or allowance of
[discriminatory] exclusion may lead individuals in the groups to conclude that they
are justified in excluding those people they perceive as different and perhaps even
justified in their hatred of people who are different.").
Van Cleave also
acknowledges the theory that legally requiring organizations to include people can
create a "backlash" which makes individuals "more angry and full of hate," actually
stalling "any initial advances in equality." Id. at 240-41.
35. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 614.
36. See generally Emily Berendt & Laura Lynn Michaels, Your H1V Positive
Client: Easing the Burden on the Family Through Estate Planning,24 J. MARSHALL
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put it bluntly, a secret life can impede probate of a will. But, as
discussed below, outness can be detrimental as well.
Lawyers engaged in estate planning for same-sex couples
know that a will can present special problems, one of them being a
possible contest. 37 While there is always a potential for such
litigation, it is relatively rare in the traditional family context
where the will designates a spouse or family member as a
beneficiary. 38 In such a situation, the interest in family harmony
L. REV. 509, 513 (1991) (stating that an attorney representing a gay client in an
estate planning matter must attempt to ascertain whether the family knows about
the client's life style); Merrianne E. Dean, Estate Planningfor Non-Traditional
Families, 309 PLI/Est 1087, 1095 (2001) (discussing how homosexual couples "may
put off seeking estate planning assistance because they are reluctant or afraid to
disclose the nature of their relationship to a stranger"); Stanley M. Johanson &
Kathleen Ford Bay, Estate Planningfor the Client with AIDS, 1989 TEXAS BAR J.
217, 217 (discussing how a gay client "may present the attorney with lifetime and
estate planning issues that are not ordinarily encountered, especially if the client's
family has not accepted his lifestyle or does not know that he is gay").
37. See Berendt & Michaels, supra note 36, at 513 (discussing how homosexual
testator's are especially vulnerable to having their wills challenged); Johanson &
Bay, supra note 36, at 217 (discussing how gay testator's can engender bitter will
contests); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
PITT. L. REV. 225 (1981) (exploring whether homosexual testators run "greater
risks" of having their wills deemed invalid on the ground of undue influence than
do heterosexuals); Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know
About Lesbians and Gay Men, Their Families, and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1, 88
(1998) (discussing how "families of a deceased gay or lesbian relative often seek to
intervene and upset wills leaving property to long term partners of the decedents").
See also Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., The Testamentary Gifts Resulting from
Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 1989 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 200, 201 (discussing how "the freedom of testation has always been
tempered by notions of fairness, justice, and especially morality" and how the
as a barometer of society's mores"); E.
undue influence doctrine "often functions ...
Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator From
MajoritarianCultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 275 (1999) (discussing how cultural minorities should take measures
to protect their estate plans from "majoritarian cultural norms"); infra notes 51-52
(discussing In re Kaufmann's Will, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965), in which the court
invalidated a will designating same-sex lover as beneficiary on the ground of undue
influence).
38. See Berendt & Michaels, supra note 36, at 513 (stating that the problem is
that a gay client "may intend to leave all or the majority of assets to a 'family'
member who is neither blood-related nor who maintains a legally recognized
relationship, to the exclusion of traditional family members"); David L. Chambers,
What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriageand the Legal Needs of Lesbian and
Gay Male Couples, 200 MICH. L. REV. 447, 458 (1996) (discussing how gay men and
lesbians with partners making wills leaving property to their lovers face
"unfortunate" consequences from "estranged" family members); Dean, supra note
36, at 1094 ('When undertaking an estate planning engagement [for homosexuals],
it is important to clearly understand the various familial relationships of your new
client, recognizing that very often 'chosen' family ties are of greater importance
than biological ties."); Johanson & Bay, supra note 36, at 218 (analyzing how
typically the attorney does not have to be too concerned about a will contest where
the will favors traditional family members); Sherman, supra note 37, at 227
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prompts survivors to acquiesce in the decedent's desires. 3 9 Where
there is a disgruntled contestant, courts tend to be disinclined to
upset a disposition to those perceived to be the natural objects of
the decedent's bounty. 40 As such, if the named beneficiaries are
spouses, children or other family members, courts typically refrain
41
from entangling themselves in the decedent's motives or morals.
When homosexuals leave property to their partners,
however, the rules change and there is often litigation. 42 The
couple's lifestyle and the decedent's openness about his or her
sexual orientation can have an impact on family members' resolve
to wage war. 43 In this context, will contests can arise in situations
in which a family is unaware of the decedent's gay or lesbian
lifestyle. 44 In fact, such contests are not usually about money;
rather, the family's resentment about being lied to or kept in the
dark about the decedent's life style often sparks the conflict. 45 The
litigation becomes a way to punish the only visible target, the
lover, who, in the minds of the contestants, had seduced the
decedent into what they see as a lie or a life of secrecy. 46 Where

(discussing how dispositions that prefer "strangers in blood to natural objects of the
testator's bounty" are regarded as "unnatural" and vulnerable to being invalidated);
Spitko, supra note 37, at 282 ('[T]he 'abohorrent' testator who disinherits her legal
spouse or close blood relations in favor of, for example, a non-mainstream religion,
a radical political organization, or a same-sex romantic partner is especially at risk
of having her estate plan discarded.").
39. See Spitko, supra note 38, at 282.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
43. Berendt & Michaels, supra note 36, at 513. The authors describe the
problems attorney face when doing estate planning for a gay client with AIDS:
[Clients in a gay family may face concerns of hostility between their
biological family and their partner, or of personal rejection and lack of
support. This may be particularly true where the client has not previously
revealed his or her sexual orientation. The biological family must
suddenly accept two facts - their close relative is gay and has a terminal
illness. The combination of grief, anger, fear, guilt, and misunderstanding
can result in a biological family that is unpredictable at best....
Id. See also Johanson & Bay, supra note 36, at 217 (writing that such a "will
contest has been seen as a means of vindicating the family's values over
homosexual practices that they could neither understand nor accept").
44. See generally supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
45. See generally supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; Johanson & Bay,
supra note 36, at 217 (discussing the "sharp increase in the number of contests filed
by family members, challenging the validity of wills in favor of the testators'
companion or friends" and that "[i]n many of these cases, it was reported the money
involved has been secondary, and the will contest has been seen as a means of
vindicating the family's values over homosexual practices that they could neither
understand nor accept').
46. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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the contestants are homophobic and actually condemn the gay or
47
lesbian lifestyle, the vendetta can be much more acrid.
The closet, however, is not an all-or-nothing place and this
can exacerbate conflict. 48 Human beings are multi-faceted and can
function in several worlds. Homosexuals can thus choose to be
open and even militant about their sexual orientation in some
arenas, but not in others.4 9 For example, certain gay lawyers
might strive to advocate equality for homosexuals and might even
become leaders in gay rights organizations and yet, in the
workplace (perhaps the more stodgy law firm) might elect not to
make an issue of their sexuality. 50
Some homosexuals come out in their own social circles,
surrounding themselves with a supportive community, but keep
51
this world discrete from parents and other family members.
Such individuals, dealing with sad reality, having come to accept
the fact that they will never be able to modify family members'
irrational animosity toward their lifestyle, simply capitulate by
extricating themselves either completely or partially from the
disapproval. 52 When such a compartmentalized individual dies
and leaves property to a lover, family members again tend to
blame the beneficiary, who, in their view, connived to alienate
them from the decedent.5 3 For them, the will contest becomes a
device for righting the wrong, for ousting the villainous converter,
and for reassembling the broken family.
As scholars have pointed out, where same-sex couples are
involved, the will contest becomes a means of "vindicating the
family's values over homosexual practices that [family members]

47. See supra note 43.
48. See Scouting, supra note 8, at 105-106.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. One of the famous examples of this is in In re Kaufmann's Will, 20 A.D.2d 464
(1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (1965), in which the court found the testator's will to
have been the product of undue influence by the beneficiary, the decedent's samesex partner. In that case, the two men lived together and appeared in social circles
as a couple while they kept themselves essentially apart from the decedent's
family. Id. See also infra note 52; Sherman, supra note 37, at 239-48 (discussing
the Kaufmann case as an example of how the homosexual testator is especially
vulnerable to a will contest and needs to take special estate planning measures to
circumvent the problem).
52. What is sad about the situation in In re Kaufmann is that the testator felt
safe to share his identity with his family only after his death through a letter that
he signed contemporaneously with one of his wills leaving property to his same-sex
lover. See Sherman, supra note 37, at 671.
53. See generally supra note 38.
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could neither understand nor accept."5 4 This is the real problem:
the battle is lodged against homosexuality itself and because the
55
target is an abstraction, the rancor can be great and prolonged.
Such tensions can, and often are, augmented when the decedent
was afflicted with AIDS. 56 Here family members sometimes vilify
the beneficiary for still another thing - namely, the transmission
57
of disease and death.
What is apodictic about will contest stories is that they
never have happy endings. That is, regardless of who wins or
loses, the common denominators are expensive litigation and at
least, a modicum of emotional turmoil in which the testator's
chosen beneficiary and his or her allies are pitted against the
decedent's family members.5 8 Such a battle not only engenders ill
will and animosity, but in the context of a same-sex couple also
fuels anti-homosexual sentiments.5 9 As the litigation proceeds and
bitterness builds, family members ascribe the stress and
disruption of their lives to homosexuality itself. 60 For them, the
same-sex relationship equates with poison. 61 If and when they
prevail, the victory somehow seems disappointedly devoid of real
vindication because the contestants' real goal, the very
annihilation of a lifestyle or the vanquishment of a sexual
orientation is simply not possible.
A "successful" will contest breeds its own insidious defeat:
that is, upsetting an estate plan constitutes a deprivation of an
individual's fundamental right to designate the successors to his or
her own property at death. 62 But more broadly, such contests can
devastate society by promoting unhealthy bias and cruel
stereotypes.

54. Johanson & Bay, supra note 36, at 217.
55. Kirk Johnson, AIDS Victims' Wills Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1987,
at B1.
56. See id. ("[Clontests can be particularly bitter, especially if the family views
the testator's companion as the cause both of their child's (or brother's) lifestyle and
of his death.").
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Johanson & Bay, supra note 36, at 217.
60. See Johnson, supra note 55.
61. See id.
62. Johanson & Bay, supra note 36, at 217. See also deFuria, supra note 37, at
200 ('Even though the ability to dispose of one's property by will is not a federally
protected right, the privilege of testation is commonly considered a 'right'
fundamental to our form of government.").
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II. THE CLOSET AND MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONSHIPS
When there is no valid will, the probate code steps in to
essentially write the will by dictating which family members
receive what portions of a decedent's estate. 63 What intestacy
provisions aim to accomplish is a "disposition of property under
administration as the owner, acting rationally, would have
disposed of it if living." 64 One of the main policies behind the
probate laws is testamentary freedom. 65 The law generally aims
to bestow upon testators the freedom to dispose of their property

63. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 71-157 (2000) (treating intestacy as an "Estate Plan by Default");
Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to ChangingFamilies, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1,
1 (2000) ("Intestacy statutes create, in effect, a statutory will - a will in which the
government, rather than the individual, determines the dispositive terms.");
Marissa Holob, Respecting Commitment- A Proposalto Prevent Legal BarriersFrom
Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 2000 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 149899 (discussing the general policies of probate codes and how they fill the void in the
absence of a valid will); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in
Transition, 1994 MO. L. REV. 21, 28 (discussing how intestacy laws serve as default
rules and explaining that historically this has not always been true).
64. ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND
ADMINISTRATION 160 (1928). See also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at
74 ("The primary policy [behind an intestacy statute] ... is to carry out the probable
intent of the average intestate decedent."); Holob, supra note 63, at 1499 (arguing
that the Uniform Probate Code has the same objective). But see Gary, supra note
63, at 1-2 (pointing out that "[a]n analysis of intestacy law must begin with the
recognition that an intestacy statute cannot work equally well for every potential
decedent."). Gary explains:
Indeed, developing an intestacy statute that will meet the needs or wishes
of all persons is both unnecessary and impossible. There are too many
variations on what decedents want, too many family situations to consider
and too many special circumstances surrounding individual decedents. An
intestacy statute can serve as a default rule, but a person whose wishes do
not fit the default rule must execute a will.

Id.
65. See e.g., deFuria, supra note 36, at 200 (discussing how "the freedom of
testamentary disposition is one of the basic tenets of our social structure").
DeFuria explains that "restrictions on the freedom of testation are usually
considered anathema both to private property rights and to the rights of the
individual" and that "[in view of this sentiment, the intent of the testator has
naturally played a dominant role in giving effect to his last wishes." Id. See also
Gary, supra note 63, at 8 ("While freedom of testation is not unlimited, it continues
to be substantial."); Holob, supra note 63, at 1499 (discussing how the law favors
freedom of testation as economically and socially beneficial); Johanson & Bay,
supra note 36, at 217 (describing "[t]he right of a person to designate who will
succeed to ownership of his or her property at death" as "fundamental to our
property system"); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act,
1975 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) ("The first principle of the law of wills is
freedom of testation."); Spitko, supra note 37, at 276 ("Our society is committed in
principle to the ideal of testamentary freedom.").
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in any manner they wish.66 Intestacy exports this principle to
situations in which there is no will, aiming to express, through a
default plan, society's commitment to what is presumed to be the
donative intent of typical decedent. 67 Statutes typically contain
generous provisions for surviving spouses. 66
Even the sacrosanct goal of fulfilling the decedent's
donative intent, however, has its limitations. Most probate codes
in separate property states have what is called an elective share or
forced share that ensures that a minimum percentage of the estate
goes to the decedent's spouse. 69 In fact, this applies even when
66. See generally supra note 64.
67. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 74 (discussing how
the primary policy behind the intestacy statutes "requires that we decide what

persons who die intestate would most likely want"); Gary, supra note 63, at 8-9
('The ability to rely on an intestacy statute for distribution of property may be
related to the idea of freedom of testation."); Holob, supra note 63, at 1500
(explaining that because of the importance of "fulfilling the decedent's donative
intent, ... it is natural to extend this principle to the disposition of property when
no will exists, further reflecting society's commitment to donative freedom.").
68. Dukeminier and Johanson state:
In the last 20 years, a number of empirical studies have been made of
popular preferences as to intestate succession. Although these studies do
not always agree, they unanimously support the conclusion that the
spouse's share given by most intestacy statutes is too small. They show
that most persons want everything to go to the surviving spouse when
there are no children from a prior marriage, thus excluding parents and
brothers and sisters. This preference is particularly strong among persons
with moderate estates, who believe the surviving spouse will need the
entire estate for support.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 74. See also Chambers, supra note 38,

at 455-56 (describing the state laws designating the spouse as the recipient of part
or all of a married person's property when he or she dies without a will); Gary,
supra note 63, at 20 (discussing the research focusing on how property should be
distributed under the intestacy laws, she points out that "[e]mpirical data showed
that persons preferred to give the surviving spouse all or most of the estate, with
variations depending upon whether the decedent left children who were not
biological or adopted children of the surviving spouse"); Holob, supra note 63, at
1498 ('[M]ost probate codes ensure that spouses receive a guaranteed minimum
percentage of the decedent's estate, regardless of any testamentary instruments to
the contrary."); Waggoner, supra note 63, at 34 (discussing spousal rights in
intestacy). Waggoner points out that:
[i]ncluded within the assumption that decedents have "just" motives are
that decedents mean to be generous to their surviving spouses, mean to
strike a fair balance between their surviving spouses and children (that is,
to be fair to all), but, above all, in striking that fair balance, mean at the
very least to provide economic security for their surviving spouses.

Id.
69. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 480-81 (discussing the
elective share and its rationale). Dukeminier and Johanson point out that "[aill but
a share
one [Georgia] of the separate property states give the surviving spouse ...
in the decedent's property." Id. According to Dukeminier and Johanson, "[t]he
proclaimed underlying policy (at least in most states) is that the surviving spouse
contributed to the decedent's acquisition of wealth and deserves to have a portion of
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there is a testamentary instrument to the contrary. 70 There is,
however, no equivalent statutory accommodation for same-sex
partners.7 1 The normative statutory approach is a formalistic one,
72
depending on one question alone - is that survivor a spouse?
When the answer is "no," the code treats the lover or life-partner
73
as a complete stranger.
Because increasing numbers of people living together
outside of the contours of marriage seek entitlements that have
been exclusively reserved for spouses, courts have, albeit slowly,
begun to depart from the traditional rigid approach.74 Rather,
it." Id. See also Holob, supra note 63, at 1501 ("Decedents cannot fully disinherit
their surviving spouse."); Waggoner, supra note 63, at 47 ('All but one of the
separate-property states curtail the decedent's testamentary freedom in order to
protect the surviving spouse against disinheritance.").
70. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 480 (discussing
how the elective share or forced share statutes give the surviving spouse a choice to
"take under the decedent's will" or "renounce the will and take a fractional share of
the decedent's estate"); Waggoner, supra note 63, at 47 (explaining that "[n]o
matter what the decedent's intent, the separate-property states recognize that the
surviving spouse has a claim to some portion of the decedent's estate"). In most
states, such statutes have replaced the dower and curtesy provisions. See id.
71. Chambers, supra note 38, at 457 (pointing out that "only a very few states
provide that an unmarried partner shall receive any portion of the estate of a
person who dies without a will and, to date, no state provides anything for a samesex partner"). See also Holob, supra note 63, at 1501 (discussing how spousal
protections fail to recognize a "surviving domestic partner as a surviving spouse for
property distribution purposes"). See generally Gary, supra note 63, at 35-36
(discussing domestic partner ordinances that permit same-sex couples and
unmarried opposite sex couples to register and create a legal relationship that lets
them be treated as family for some purposes). Gary also addresses "the reciprocal
beneficiary relationship," which in Hawaii gives such an individual the same share
a surviving spouse would receive under intestate succession. See id. at 36.
72. Waggoner, supra note 63, at 61-62 ('Spousal status is what grants the person
a right to an intestate share and the right to elect a forced share if dissatisfied with
the decedent's estate plan.").
73. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1993) (concluding that the
survivor of a homosexual relationship is not entitled to a right of election against
the decedent's will); Waggoner, supra note 63, at 63 C'Regarding unmarried
couples, the law grants the survivor no right against being disinherited, thus
treating the surviving partner as having contributed nothing to the decedent's
wealth."). See also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 499 (discussing
how unmarried surviving partners have none of the benefits of unmarried
partners).
74. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 499-500 (discussing how in some
states, unmarried partners may have rights against the estate of the decedent
under contract law or have unjust enrichment claims enforceable through the
imposition of a constructive trust and claims for quantum meruit). See also Gary,
supra note 63, at 31 (discussing how "in some areas of the law legislatures and
courts are attempting to create legal rules that do make sense for today's diverse
families"); Holob, supra note 63, at 1502 (arguing that "intestacy laws should be
revised to protect domestic partners' justifiable expectations"); Vetri, supra note 37,
at 91 ('In light of the reality of our family lives today, and the slow but evolving
changes occurring in some states, it is increasingly inappropriate for state and
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some courts have embraced the meretricious relationship doctrine
that entails the examination of the characteristics of individual
75
relationships.
A. The MeretriciousRelationship Doctrine
Washington, where Vasquez was decided, is a community
property state. 76 Community property, as statutorily defined, is
that which is "acquired during marriage by labor, industry or
other valuable consideration. 77 While each spouse may own
property separately, the presumption is that the property
accumulated during marriage is community. 78 Each spouse shares
equally the managerial power over community property and has
testamentary power over his or her half of that property. 79 Upon
divorce, courts change community property into separate property
80
and arrive at a just and equitable distribution.
The division of community property also becomes an issue
at the death of one spouse. 81 In Washington, if one spouse dies
intestate and has no surviving children, siblings, or parents, "the
surviving spouse takes the entire separate estate of the

federal laws to remain immune to reform and accommodation about gay and
lesbian families.").
75. See infra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the meretricious
relationship doctrine).
76. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 472 (explaining that "[t]he
fundamental principle of community property is that all earnings of the spouses
and property acquired from earnings are community property" and that "[elach
spouse is the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the community property").
It is "[t]he death of one spouse" that "dissolves the community" and "[tihe deceased
spouse owns and has testamentary power only over his or her one-half community
share." Id. As Dukeminier and Johanson explain, "Community property is based
on the idea that husband and wife are a marital partnership, that they decide
together how to use the time of each so as to maximize their income, and that they
should share their earnings equally." Id. at 473. See also Harry M. Cross, The
Community PropertyLaw in Washington (Revised 1985), 61 WASH. L. REV. 13, 1718 (1986) (discussing the community property law of Washington).
77. Amanda J. Beane, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back: Vasquez v. Hawthorne
Wrongly Denied Washington's Meretricious Relationship Doctrine to Same-Sex
Couples, 76 WASH L. REV. 475, 478 (2001). See also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 63, at 472-73 (discussing principles of community property); Cross,
supra note 76, at 27-28 (explaining the basic presumptions of the Washington
court's interpretation of what constitutes community property).
78. See generally supra note 77.
79. See generally supra notes 76-77.
80. See Beane, supra note 77, at 479 'In marital dissolution, courts convert
community property to separate property because the marital community ceases to
exist, and then make a just and equitable distribution.").
81. See id. at 478-79. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at
472-73.
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decedent."8 2 This, of course, means that the surviving spouse
83
retains his or her own one-half share of the community property.
If, however, the decedent has surviving siblings or parents, the
spouse gets three-quarters of that separate estate.8 4 When there
85
are surviving children, the intestate share is reduced to one-half.
In Washington, courts may extend community property
rules to unmarried couples under the meretricious relationship
Originally, however, when an unmarried couple
doctrine.8 6
acquired assets, there was a bright-line rule that property
belonged to the one who held title.8 7 That rule was conceived in
Creasman v. Boyle, 88 a case which involved a meretricious
relationship between a Black man, Harvey Creasman, and a White
89
woman, Caroline Paul.
Creasman and Paul had lived together for seven years until
the woman's death.9 0 During the cohabitation, one in which the
couple held themselves out as husband and wife, Creasman
worked in a naval shipyard and earned over $13,000 in total.9 '

82. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015(1)(a) (2000); Beane, supra note 77, at 479.
83. See supranote 82.
84. § 11.04.015(1)(c). See also Beane, supra note 77, at 479.
85. § 11.04.015(1)(b). See also Beane, supra note 77, at 479.
86. See deFuria, supra note 37, at 201 n.8 ("Although 'meretricious' originally
the term, in legal parlance,
connoted purely illicit and tawdry sexual behavior ...
refers to any unlawful sexual relationship."). DeFuria discusses the meretricious
relationship doctrine, arguing that:
[i]n
light of the many changes which have taken place in how domestic
relations law treats meretricious relationships, and especially nonmarital
cohabitation, which is perhaps the archetypal meretricious relationship ....
it is no longer fitting to view a meretricious relationship as inherently
relevant, as a matter of course, in determining whether undue influence
has been exercised in the making of a testamentary gift to the surviving
partner of the relationship.
Id. at 212. See also Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 2001 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2001) (considering the "social and legal norms of ordinary
cohabitation that have evolved since [Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Ca. 1976)]");
Waggoner, supra note 63, at 69-71 (arguing that it is time to remove the
meretricious-consideration argument as an obstacle to enforcement of express
As Waggoner points out, the
contracts governing unmarried partners).
meretricious relationship involves sexual activity and because prostitution is
have held that contracts between unmarried
illegal, some "post-Marvindecisions ...
cohabitors are flat unenforceable for that reason alone ....Id. at 69. See generally
Beane, supra note 77, at 479-83 (discussing the development of the meretricious
relationship doctrine in Washington).
87. See Beane, supra note 77, at 479-82 (discussing Washington law before the
adoption of the meretricious relationship doctrine).
88. 196 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1948).
89. Id. at 836.
90. Id. at 837.

91. Id.
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Paul, however, handled all of the financial affairs. 92 Also, Paul
had entered into a contract to purchase the shared residence and
made the down payment by exchanging Creasman's car. 93 She
took title to the home in her name alone, but made the payments
94
with money that Creasman earned while they lived together.
When she died, Creasman sought title to the residence and the
95
The trial court
trial court awarded him one-half interest in it.
acknowledged that the man had been the sole financial provider,
but took account of the fact that the woman had contributed by
96
way of her "thrift" and "housekeeping."
The state supreme court reversed, ordering the trial court
to award the residence to the woman's estate. 97 In so doing, the
court said that "property acquired by a man and a woman not
married to each other, but living together as husband and wife, is
not community property, and, in the absence of some trust
relation, belongs to the one in whose name the legal title to the
property stands." 98 The court also declined to impose a resulting
trust in favor of Creasman, finding instead that "in the absence of
any evidence [of intent] to the contrary, it should be presumed as a
matter of law that the parties intended to dispose of the property
exactly as they did dispose of it."99 This became known as the
"Creasman presumption," 10 0 one which the supreme court later
discarded in In re Marriageof Lindsey. 10 1
In Lindsey, the couple began with a meretricious

92. Id.
93. Id. at 836-37.
94. Id. at 837.
95. See id. at 836.
96. Id. at 838.
97. See id. at 842.
98. Id. at 838.
99. Id. at 841. Chief Justice Mallery dissented in Creasman, arguing that
because all of the money was Creasman's, the case was a proper one to "invoke the
doctrine of a resulting trust." Id. at 843. He stated that "[n]o citations are
necessary for the rule that where one acquires title to property, either real or
personal, with the money of another, it is presumed to be held in trust for the
benefit of the other." Id. His stated reason for dissenting was that the majority
opinion had a deleterious effect on the law of resulting trust and that "[ilt seem[ed]
strange and unnatural to [him] to suppose that [Creasman] ever intended to make
such a gift to ...Paul that her heirs would take any of the property in question to
the exclusion of himself who at no time parted with either the possession or
enjoyment of it." Id. at 843-44.
100. See Beane, supra note 77, at 480-82 (discussing the CreasmanPresumption);
Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the
later-rejected Creasmanpresumption).
101. 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984).
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relationship, but later married. 0 2 Although they had no children
born of their marriage, they each had a child from a previous
marriage that lived with them. 0 3 The parties separated and
ultimately divorced. 104 At trial, the dispute revolved around the
l0 5
property that was acquired prior to and during the marriage.
of labor that
There was contradictory evidence over the amount
10 6
each party had expended to improve the property.
Apparently, before the marriage, the couple had logged
certain property, netted about $30,000, and then constructed a
barn and shop on the farm. 10 7 When they were married, the
husband had certain separate property while his spouse had no
assets of her own. 08 The couple maintained a joint checking
account and spent what they earned. 109
The husband worked for the family business and his wife
was the homemaker that cared for the children, horses and
farm. 110 For about a year, however, the wife also worked for her
husband's family business and was paid about $500 a month."'
The husband had a gross income of over $45,000 one year and
$28,000 another year. 112 There was one year, however, in which
the business did poorly and the husband had to borrow $25,000
from his family members." 3 The couple acquired and bred horses,
some of which they trained for the racing circuit." 4 When the
parties started building a family home on the farm, they borrowed
money from the husband's mother, family business, and a bank. 115
After a fire destroyed the barn and shop on the property, the
insurance proceeds amounted to over $85,000.116
The trial court, applying the Creasmanpresumption, found
that most of the assets before marriage were the husband's
separate property and awarded him the realty. 117 The court
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See
Id.
See
See
See
Id.
See
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 329.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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determined which were the community property assets and
equitably divided them.118 The trial court did not take into
account any contribution the wife may have made to the
construction of the barn and shop.119 In addition to the realty, the
husband received the stock in his family business, personal effects,
120
horses and car insurance proceeds.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington critically
examined the Creasman presumption and later cases, finding that
"the rule often operates to the great advantage of the cunning and
the shrewd, who wind up with possession of the property, or title
to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretricious
relationship."'12 1 The court also acknowledged that other courts,
avoiding the Creasman presumption by creating exceptions, had
made the "law unpredictable and at times onerous."' 122 As such,
the Lindsey court decided that it was simply time to eradicate

Creasman.123

In place of Creasman, the court in Lindsey required courts
to "examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property
accumulations and then make a just and equitable disposition of
the property."' 24 The courts, however, should not employ any
"rigid set of requirements," but instead should examine each case
on its own facts. 125 In reviewing the trial court's award, the
supreme court found that the realty owned by the husband before
marriage was properly characterized as separate and that the trial
court also correctly distributed the other assets, including the
horses.' 26 The supreme court, however, was troubled over the
insurance proceeds and the fact that the trial court did not award
the wife any property interest in the barn and shop that had
burned. 127 Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the
128
trial court to consider the wife's interest in that structure.

118. See id. (reporting that the wife received her personal effects, car insurance
proceeds, four horses, a pickup, and some cash for community labor on the family

residence).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 329-30.
121. Id. at 330 (quoting West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1957) (Finley, J.,
concurring specially)).
122. Id. at 331.
123. See id.
124. Id. (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 (1976)).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 332.
127. Id.
128. See id.
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In Connell v. Francisco,129 a case involving the division of
property between an unmarried couple, the court developed the
Lindsey approach and the meretricious relationship doctrine. In
Connell, the woman was a dancer in a stage show when she met
Francisco, the producer, who later invited her to move in with him
in Las Vegas. 130 While the couple lived there for about three
years, Connell continued 13her work as a dancer and helped
Francisco with his business. '
After one of Francisco's companies purchased a bed and
breakfast on a Washington island, the couple moved to the island
and cohabitated there until the end of the relationship. 13 2 During
that time, Connell worked at the inn, making breakfast, cleaning
rooms, taking reservations, doing laundry, paying bills and
3 3 For almost two years, she
assisting with general maintenance.
13 4
labor.
received a salary for her
Further, the local community saw the couple as married
and Connell even used Francisco's surname for business
purposes. 135 Further, Francisco had given Connell an engagement
136
ring and executed a will leaving her the corpus of his estate.
Connell did not make any financial contribution toward the
purchase of any of the properties acquired during this time and
name individually or in the name
title to them was in Francisco's
137
of one of his companies.
At the end of the relationship, Connell sought "a just and
equitable distribution of the property acquired during the
relationship" and the trial court, finding that the "relationship was
sufficiently long term and stable," granted her relief. 138 The court
limited the property subject to distribution of that which "would
have been community in character" had the parties been legally
married and required Connell to prove this by a preponderance of
the evidence. 3 9 The only property, however, that the court felt
was "community in character

129. 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995).
130. See id. at 832-33.
131. Id. at 833.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.

...

was the increased value of
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Francisco's pension plan."'140 The court felt that Connell simply
did not meet her burden with respect to any of the remaining

assets. 141
In reversing, the court of appeals determined that the
meretricious relationship doctrine applied to "both property owned
by each prior to the relationship and property that would have
142
been community in character had the parties been married.
The court felt that the doctrine must be applied "to all property
' 143
acquired during the relationship."
In reviewing the matter, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that only "property acquired during the relationship"
was subject to distribution. 44 The court defined a meretricious
relationship as "a stable, marital-like relationship where both
parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between
them does not exist" and set forth the relevant factors that
establish such a relationship. 145 The unexhaustive list of factors
include: "continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship,
purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for
joint projects, and the intent of the parties."'146 The court implied
that no one factor is determinative and stated that a relationship
does not have to be "long term" to be deemed meretricious. 147 That
is, a short-term relationship may suffice where other sufficient
48
factors are present.
Significantly, the Connell court pointed out that "[a]
meretricious relationship is not the same as a marriage" and cited
cases holding that certain benefits are available only to married
couples. 149 Consequently, since marital property distribution laws
do not directly apply to meretricious relationships, Washington
courts may turn to these laws for guidance only.' 5 0 The court
explained that the differing treatment of property under each
relationship is the result of a freedom of choice: "[t]he parties to
such a [meretricious] relationship have chosen not to get married
and therefore the property owned by each party prior to the
140. Id. at 833-34.
141. Id. at 834.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 837.
145. Id. at 834.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 835.
150. See id.
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relationship should not be before the court for distribution at the
end of the relationship."'1 51 The property acquired during the
relationship, however, is subject to distribution to avoid unjust
The court concluded that "[a]ny other
enrichment. 152
interpretation equates cohabitation with marriage" and "ignores
153
the conscious decision by many couples not to marry."'
As a result, the real property purchased during their
meretricious relationship was presumed to be owned by both
Connell and Francisco. 154 Francisco, however, could overcome
such a presumption by presenting evidence to show that the real
property was obtained with his separate funds. 5 5 If the trial court
found that such realty is owned by Francisco alone, Connell could
still "establish that any increase in value of Francisco's property
occurred during their meretricious relationship and is attributable
to 'community' funds or efforts" and she could be reimbursed for
56
her contributions. 1
B. The Decision in Vasquez v. Hawthorne
In Vasquez v. Hawthorne,15 7 Washington courts considered
the applicability of the Lindsey and Connell decisions to an alleged
meretricious relationship between two men, Vasquez and
58
Schwerzler, who had lived together for twenty-six years.1
151. Id. at 836.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 837.
155. See id.
156. Id. Justice Utter authored a dissenting opinion in Connell in which he
accused the majority of "establish[ing] a new rule that will be uncertain in
application and will likely interfere with the ability of the courts to 'make a just
and equitable distribution of the property' as is required by Lindsey." Id.
Essentially, he objected to the majority's "limit[ation of] the distribution of property
following a meretricious relationship to property that would have been
characterized as community property had the parties been married" because it
makes the outcome hinge on how the court characterized each piece of property.
Id. at 837-38.
157. 994 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), reversed and vacated by 33 P.3d 735
(Wash. 2001).
158. Id. at 241. The Washington Supreme Court found factual disputes between
the parties. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 737 (summarizing the contest between the
affidavits). Therefore, the facts set forth in this Article are almost entirely from the
perspective of Vasquez as presented in his Supplemental Brief to the Washington
Supreme Court. Supplemental Brief of Appellant Frank Vasquez, Vasquez v.
Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001) (No. 69655-1) [hereinafter Vasquez
Supplemental Brief]. This perspective is used because the appellate division
implied that even if the relationship between the two men was found to be exactly
as portrayed by Vasquez, the court still would not find the relationship to be
meretricious. Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 241 ("A meretricious relationship cannot exist
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When Schwerzler died, he was seventy-eight years old and
Vasquez was sixty-one.15 9 It was established in the trial court that
Vaszquez and Schwerzler had a close personal relationship and
held themselves out as a couple. 160 In fact, their circle of friends
considered them a couple. 161 Schwerzler gave Vasquez a diamond
ring for their seventh anniversary and gave him another one for
their twenty-fifth anniversary. 162 Schwerzler had birthday parties
163
for Vasquez and bestowed presents on him for other occasions.
He also baked his partner a cake nearly every week throughout
their years together. 64 When he was in public, he often referred
to Vasquez as "my partner," and said that "he did not know what
he would do without him."'165 It was widely acknowledged that
Vasquez was completely distraught when his partner of almost
6
three decades died.16
There were other interdependencies between the couple
that made the loss of his partner devastating for Vasquez,
including the fact that Vasquez was illiterate and as a result
Schwerzler managed their financial affairs. 167
During the
relationship, the title of their acquired property was in
168
Schwerzler's name alone.
Throughout their relationship, the men made their living
recycling boxes and bags and did this work from home by
themselves. 169 It was a business without an overhead that
generated a healthy income. 170
Schwerzler, however, had a
gambling habit and he squandered much of their earnings in this
way. 171 It was also established in the trial court that Schwerzler
had announced to others that this income paid for their home and
belongings. 172 Unfortunately, when Schwerzler died, the business

between members of the same sex.").
159. Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 159, at 2-3.
160. See id. at 3.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 3-4.
167. See id. at 4.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. According to one of Schwerzler's longtime friends who helped in the
business, there was a net annual income of $275,000 a year or more. Id. at 4 n.22.
171. See id. at 4.
172. See id. at 4-5.
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died with him. 173 Hawthorne, the personal representative of the
174
estate, assigned no value to it.

Aside from the recycling business, the couple had also
bought and sold apartment buildings and a house. 175 Vasquez was
responsible for tenant relations, rent collection, maintenance, and
most of the grounds upkeep. 76 Schwerzler never paid Vasquez for
his work in their recycling business, nor for his services in
connection with the rental properties. 177 Vasquez presumably did
not expect payment "because he and Schwerzler were life
78
partners."1
Over the years, friends had heard Vasquez tell Schwerzler
that he feared "Schwerzler's relatives would put him out on the
street" if Schwerzler were the first to die. 1 79

Schwerzler would

allay Vasquez's concerns by telling him that he had made
arrangements to provide for Vasquez. 180 Witnesses recalled seeing
81
Schwerzler hug Vasquez as he consoled him.'
Schwerzler had several assets in his name when he died,
including the house that he and Vasquez shared, a life insurance
policy, two automobiles, and a checking account. 182 When no will
could be found, "Vasquez filed a claim against the estate, asserting
that he and Schwerzler had been homosexual life-partners and
that he was entitled ...to a share of the community property."'183

His position rested on case law (presumably Lindsey, Connell and
their progeny) that allowed individuals in a meretricious
relationship to a share of the property. 184 Two of Schwerzler's four
siblings decided to fight Vasquez. l5
When the personal representative opposed the claim,
Vasquez pursued it further in court.1 8 6 The superior court
awarded nearly all of the estate property to Vasquez on partial
173. See id. at 5.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 5-6.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 6.
181. See id.
182. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 241 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), reversed
and vacated by 33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001).
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. For this information, I am indebted to Mr. Terry J. Barnett of Rumbaugh,
Rideout & Barnett in Tacoma, Washington, the attorney for Frank Vasquez.
186. Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 241.
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was Vasquez'
summary judgment. 8 7 All that was left for trial 188
trust.
constructive
and
partnership
claims of implied
In a case of first impression, the personal representative
appealed, contending that "as a matter of law, a same-sex
The
relationship cannot be a meretricious relationship."'18 9
appellate court traced the history of the meretricious relationship
doctrine in Washington and ended in agreement with the personal
representative. 190 After an ostensibly accurate analysis of Connell
and its predecessors, the Vasquez court concluded "that a
'meretricious relationship' is one where the parties may legally
marry."'19 1 The court understood this case law as assuming the
proposition that such a relationship may only exist between a male
192
and female.
Turning to statutory marriage restrictions, the appellate
193
court emphasized that "the parties must be of the opposite sex."'
Further, the court stated that it found "no precedent for applying
the marital concepts, either rights or protections, to same-sex
relationships" and that "community property law clearly applies
only to opposite-sex relationships." 194 The court noted that there
are other avenues of legal recourse available to Vasquez,
particularly in the form of constructive trust and implied
195
partnership.
The Washington Supreme Court vacated the appellate
court's decision, reversed the trial court's partial summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial. 196 The court's analysis
focused primarily on the procedural posture of the case - namely
that it was decided on summary judgment. 9 7 The court found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the type
of relationship that existed between the two men and what
98
property they had acquired in the course of that relationship.1
Consequently, the supreme court held that the trial court erred by
disposing of the case on summary judgment and that the court of

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 241-43.
Id. at 242.
See id.
Id. at 243 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 738 (Wash. 2001).
See id. at 737.
See id.
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appeals erred by reaching the merits of the case. 199
In its decision, the supreme court provided some guidance
for the lower tribunal: the focus must be on the "equities involved
between the parties" and such claims "are not dependent on the
'legality' of the relationship between the parties, nor are they
limited by the gender or sexual orientation of the parties." 200 The
court emphasized that in the prior meretricious relationship cases,
the term "marital-like" is merely an analogy and that equating
such cohabitation with marriage would create a de facto common
201
law marriage - a move the court has repeatedly rejected.
Therefore, the court stated, "equitable claims must be analyzed
202
under the specific facts presented in each case."
C. Coming Out Without A Will
The appellate decision in Vasquez has four flaws, all of
them rooted in judicial homophobia. 2 3 Although the Washington
Supreme Court reversed, it did not eradicate the underlying
discrimination against same-sex couples. In fact, the supreme
court's majority and concurring decisions effectually fuel prejudice
and fail to encourage gay and lesbian couples to emerge from the
closet.
First, in declining to apply marital concepts to same-sex
relationships, the Vasquez appellate court derogates significant
policies underlying intestacy laws in the United States. The
predominant intestacy goal is that of honoring the decedent's
intent. 20 4 As mentioned above, intestacy law, built upon a
commitment to donative freedom, applies to situations in which
there is no will by presuming what the intended disposition would
be. 205 While intestacy statutes are default estate plans, there are
doctrines, like that of the meretricious relationship, that give such
plans flexibility. 20 6 That is, where it can be shown that the

199. See id. at 736.
200. Id. at 737.
201. Id. at 737-38.
202. Id. at 738. There were concurring decisions in the case. See infra notes 314329 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Sanders and Chief Justice
Alexander's separate concurring opinions).
203. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing homophobia and the
damaging gay and lesbian stereotypes).
204. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing homophobia and the
damaging gay and lesbian stereotypes).
205. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing meretricious
relationship doctrine).
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decedent's donative intent does not mesh with that of the statutory
model, then the property could be distributed in a different and
20 7
more equitable fashion.
The Vasquez facts epitomize a situation in which donative
intent falls outside of the statutory configuration. 208 The Vasquez
facts showed that the donor Schwerzler intended for his long-time
companion to succeed to his property. 20 9 It was undisputed that
the men presented themselves as a couple and that Schwerzler
made public displays of that bond, calling Vasquez his "partner"
2 10
and proclaiming their interdependency.
It was this interdependency that further warranted the
designation of Vasquez as a beneficiary to Schwerzler's estate.
Specifically, Vasquez's illiteracy, made him dependent on
211
Schwerzler to manage their mutual financial affairs.
Schwerzler's financial management, in turn, led to the title to
2 12
their mutually acquired property to be held in his name alone.
The two also depended on each other to share in the labor and
management of their recycling business and apartment
buildings. 213 In this regard, their arrangement was no different
than it would be if they were a married couple that also worked
and shared a business together: there was no salary from one to
the other, just a sharing of assets. 214 However, the evidence also
demonstrated that Schwerzler intended to provide for Vasquez if
215
Schwerzler was the first to die.
In deeming Vasquez not entitled to share in the property as
a meretricious partner, 21 6 the appellate court disparaged the
predominant goal behind intestacy laws when it disregarded

207. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing meretricious
relationship doctrine).
208. See supra notes 157-202 accompanying text (discussing Vasquez facts and
holding).
209. See Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 159, at 5-6. See also supra
notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
210. See Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 159, at 3.
211. See id. at 4.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 4-5.
214. See id. at 5 ('Schwerzler never paid Vasquez for Vasquez's work in the
recycling business or with the rental properties. Vasquez did not expect payment,
because he and Schwerzler were life partners."). See also id. at 4 ('This income
paid for his and Vasquez's home, and everything else they had.").
215. See id. ("Schwerzler told [Vasquez] not to worry, that he had seen to it that
Vasquez would never want for anything. Sometimes Schwerzler hugged Vasquez
as he said this.").
216. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
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donative intent. 217
The outcome in Vasquez is even more
disturbing when one considers that the Washington courts had
devised the meretricious relationship doctrine for the very purpose
of accommodating those relationships in a community property
state that do not precisely fit the intestate prototype. 218 In fact,
the marital concept was designed for the very sort of situation that
existed in Vasquez, one in which donative intent points one way
2 19
and the statute another.
There are, however, other goals of intestacy that the
appellate court ignored or at least failed to extend to contemporary
reality.220 One of the intestacy objectives is to make sure that
there is a fair distribution of property among family members and
the law in Washington reflects that policy. 221 The Washington
intestacy statute, like many others, comports with general
property law, tipping its hat to the surviving spouse. 222 The
surviving spouse takes the entire decedent's estate if there are no
children, siblings, or parents and receives a diminished share
223
where such surviving relations exist.

The Vasquez appellate court essentially excised Vasquez
from any spousal entitlements. 224 While Vasquez was not legally a
spouse under Washington law, 225 the jurisdiction had adopted a

meretricious (or marital-like) doctrine, which would have
effectually placed Vasquez under the umbrella that ensures fair

217. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of
meretricious relationship doctrine in the state of Washington). See also Beane,
supra note 77, at 479 (discussing how the Washington Supreme Court developed
the meretricious relationship doctrine by abandoning the unfavorable treatment of

unmarried couples).
219. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
behind the meretricious relationship doctrine and how the doctrine avoids
rewarding only the individual holding title to property).
220. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text (discussing intestacy, estate
and community property laws).
221. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; Holob, supra note 63, at 1500
("[P]robate codes seek to avoid creating dissatisfaction among family members in
the disposition of an estate."); supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text (discussing
laws protecting spouses and family members under the community property
scheme in Washington).
222. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing accommodations
for spouses in intestacy statutes and in the form of the elective share); supra notes
82-85 and accompanying text (discussing protections for surviving spouses under
Washington law).
223. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 157-202 and accompanying text (discussing Vasquez facts
and holding).
225. See supranote 193 and accompanying text.
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distribution among "family" members. 226 The property at stake in
Vasquez should fall under Washington's community property
statute because it was acquired during a marital-like relationship
227
by "labor, industry, and other valuable consideration."
Moreover, it was shown in the trial court that the lifestyle of these
men resembled that of any typical "marriage." 228 And under
Washington law, the appellate court could have treated
Schwerzler and Vasquez as a meretricious couple and the spousal
229
entitlement could have at least partially attached to Vasquez.
Had the couple been heterosexual, the intestacy law's goals and
Washington's meretricious doctrine would have undoubtedly
230
governed.
Other policies behind the intestacy law are to protect
financial dependents and enrich the nuclear family. 231 It is not
remarkable that Washington promotes such goals by providing for
surviving spouses and minor children. 232 These goals, however,
necessarily coexist with another reality: intestacy laws are simply
not static. 233 While it can be said that the intestacy laws have not
exactly kept pace with contemporary society, such laws have
modulated over time to meet changing norms. 234 In fact, the whole
226. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of the meretricious relationship doctrine in Washington).
227. See supra note 76-85 and accompanying text (discussing Washington's
community property law). See supra notes 170, 175-178 (describing how the men
worked as business partners and Vasquez received no salary for his labor).
228. See supra notes 160-181 and accompanying text (describing marriage-like
details of the relationship between Schwerzler and Vasquez).
229. See supra notes 145-148 (defining the meretricious relationship doctrine in
Washington). See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the
evolution of the meretricious relationship doctrine in the context of heterosexual
couples).
230. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text.
231. See Holob, supra note 63, at 1501. Holob, however, points out that
"[d]ifficulty arises ... in trying to define the term 'family"' and that "[h]istorically,
society has valued the institution of the family - one consisting of a heterosexual,
married couple and their biological children - for its legal, social, and religious
significance." Id. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text (discussing goals of
intestacy and estate laws).
232. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (summarizing pertinent
statutory provisions in Washington).
233. See generally Holob, supra note 63, at 1496-99 (describing the history and
development of the intestacy laws); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Commercial Code,
55 ALB. L. REV. 871 (1992). See also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at
72 (discussing the changes to the Uniform Probate Code which was originally
promulgated in 1969).
234. See Holob, supra note 63, at 1495 ("Estate planning is an especially
problematic area for nontraditional families."). Holob further states, "fals more and
more couples choose alternative family arrangements, current intestate succession
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history of intestacy is about change, about British ways meeting
23 5
their demise when they arrived in the New World.
While the modern law of wills dates back to Roman times,
our closest ancestor is the English common law of inheritance with
its male preference and separate treatment of land and
personalty. 236 Historically, such testamentary law ministered to
what we now consider archaisms, like dower and curtesy, and
conformed to a feudalistic society, the cornerstone of which was
primogeniture, a system in which land descended to the eldest
son. 237 While United States law is rooted in this English model,
our legislatures had to tweak some of the rules to fit our
idiosyncrasies.
While primogeniture is gone and dower and
curtesy are practically defunct, the United States probate system
recognizes not just the surviving spouse, but also nonmarital and
adopted children. 238 The once rigid English demarcation between
realty and personalty and the male preference have also vanished
because of incompatibility with the United States adherence to
testamentary freedom, our historic mistrust of dynastic
239
aristocracies, and our professed allegiance to equality.
laws adequately protect an increasingly smaller portion of society. Although
significant changes have occurred in intestate succession laws, these changes do
not satisfy all of the needs of domestic partners." Id.
235. See id. at 1496-98 (describing "historical variations between U.S. and British
probate laws").
236. See id.
237. See id. See also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 478-79
(describing dower and curtesy). They explain that "[i]n feudal times, when land
was the chief form of wealth and provided the power base of the head of the family,
dower provided generous support to the widow of a propertied man." Id. at 478.
Under the law of dower, the widow gets a life estate in "one-third of her husband's
qualifying land" and basically, the "qualifying land" is "all land of which her
deceased husband had been seised during marriage and which was inheritable by
the issue of husband and wife." Id. Curtesy is similar to dower except that the
husband does not acquire it unless children are born of the marriage. Id. at 479.
Also, under the law of curtesy, the husband gets a "life estate in the entire parcel,
not merely in one-third." Id. Dower and curtesy have been abolished in most
states. Id.
238. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 479 (describing
the virtual abolition of dower and curtesy). As they explain, "[clurtesy survives
today in one or two states only as a label given to the support interest of the
husband, which in fact has been made identical with the wife's common law dower."
See id. According to Dukeminier and Johanson, dower exists in its common law
form in only five states: Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan and
Ohio. See id. at 102 (discussing inheritance rights of adopted children, which
"var[ies] considerably from state to state") and 115-16 (discussing the evolution of
the inheritance laws' treatment of nonmarital children, who were once considered
"filius nullius, the child of no one, and could inherit from neither father nor
mother").
239. See Holob, supra note 63, at 1497-98. She explains:
With the development of a market economy in colonial America, feudal
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The Vasquez appellate court tramples on intestacy goals
and essentially stops the clock. One of the perspicuous facts in the
Vasquez case is Vasquez's financial dependence upon his partner,
a situation which in some ways replicates that of the traditional
wife. Although Vasquez put time and labor into the generation of
"marital" property, he was illiterate and Schwerzler was the
manager with title to the property. 240 The record reflected the fact
that this couple acknowledged Vasquez's dependency. Vasquez
himself expressed fear of being tossed out into the street upon his
partner's death and Schwerzler made public promises to prevent
such destitution. 241 Here there was financial dependence and a
The appellate court, however, refused to
needy survivor.
acknowledge that the situation mirrored the one that intestacy
aims to protect and simply did what Vasquez feared - put him out
on the street. Not only did that contravene what was shown to be
his partner's donative intent, but it also eviscerated the salutary
estate goal of caring for financial dependents.
The infirmity, however, goes beyond just slighting the
policies behind United States intestacy law. While the historical
perspective on inheritance discloses a law that has changed
considerably since the British progenitor, and surely since its more
ancient Roman rudiment, 242 the Vasquez court puts the law in a
kind of majoritarian deep freeze. The slogan, "promotion of the
nuclear family," is seductive, but in truth meaningless when
24 3
severed from the context of a society that is in constant flux.
No one would deny that there was a time when society
defined the immediate "family" as a married heterosexual couple

Because there was an abundance of
principles were not applicable.
unclaimed land throughout our nation's history, the United States did not
attach as much importance to its ownership as the British did. In
addition, the preference for male descendants over female descendants in
intestacy law began to erode in America during colonial times, long before
it did in England. This preference disappeared because it "was considered
incompatible with that equality ...which it is the constitutional policy of
With an abhorrence of
this country to preserve and inculcate."
"aristocracy [and] family dynasties," American probate codes developed by
focusing on "individual freedom of disposition."
Id. (quoting LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 33 (1997)).
240. See Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 4-5.
241. See id. at 5-6.
242. See Holob, supra note 63, at 1496 ("Although documents resembling wills
have been in existence for five thousand years, the modern American law of wills
owes its origins to the Romans," who "defined inheritance as 'universal succession'
and believed that the inheritor did not simply represent the deceased but
'continued his civil life, his legal existence."').
243. See supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
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plus biological offspring. 244 The definition, however, has expanded
over the past decades to encompass all sorts of bonds.245 The irony
here is that the Vasquez appellate court's denial of the very
evolving nature of the law occurred in a jurisdiction that, through
common law and its abolition of the Creasman presumption, has
done the opposite - namely, nourish the transforming concept of
246
family.
Washington is known for its progressive approach to
meretricious relationships, but also for its formulation of property
rights; this exemplifies a healthy symbiosis between the
legislature and the judiciary. 247 Washington courts, in burying the
Creasman presumption, have balanced deference to statutes that
define and enumerate the benefits attendant to marriage with
244. See generally Beane, supranote 77, at 475-77 (discussing how law is adapted

to the traditional family); Chambers, supra note 38, at 452-54 (discussing the legal
consequences of marriage); Dean, supra note 36, at 1091-92 (discussing how law
has not kept up with the non-traditional family); Gary, supra note 63, at 1-6
(discussing how intestacy statutes fit the traditional family); Holob, supra note 63,
at 1493-96 (discussing how estate planning is easier for the traditional family);
Spitko, supra note 37, at 280-82 (arguing that fact-finders discard estate plans in
favor of intestacy scheme that fits the cultural norms); Vetri, supra note 37, at 3-4
(discussing the changing view of family and how the laws must adapt); Taya N.
Williams, Committed Partnership: The Legal Status of Committed Partnerships
and Their Children, 13 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 221, 223 (1999) (discussing how family
is defined for purpose of intestacy as "a married couple and children of that
marriage").
245. See Beane, supra note 77, at 479 (discussing cohabiting unmarried couples
and how Washington law has accommodated them); Chambers, supra note 38, at
449-52 (describing the lifestyle of gay and lesbian adults that live with a person of
the same sex and regard that person as their life partner); Dean, supra note 36, at
1091 (describing "[n]on-traditional families" as including "gay and lesbian couples,
unmarried cohabitants of opposite gender and people who have created informal
parenting relationships with the children of their domestic partners, nieces and
nephews, grandchildren or other children needing love and suppor"); Estin, supra
note 86, at 1384 (describing cohabitants that have "no rights or obligations that
arise by virtue of their shared life"); Gary, supra note 63, at 5-6 (describing the
"functional definition" of family as including "family members those who function
as family members, those for whom close, loving, caring and nurturing family
relationships exist"); Holob, supra note 63, at 1501 (describing how "the
configuration of family has undergone a dramatic change"); Vetri, supra note 37, at
21 (arguing that "[t]he traditional nuclear family - a legally married heterosexual
couple living with their biological children - is no longer the dominant pattern of
the American household" and that "[o]nly one half of the country's children live in
such families today"); Williams, supra note 244, at 221 C'Single-parent, unmarried
couples, same-sex and opposite-sex committed partnerships households (including
children) have increased.").
246. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
the meretricious relationship doctrine in Washington).
247. See generally Beane, supranote 77, at 474-79 (describing the progressive law
in Washington and explaining how "[s]tatutory schemes and common law govern
the disposition of community property and separate property in the event of
dissolution or death").
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basic equities and the aim to avoid unjust enrichment. 248 As such,
Washington's meretricious relationship doctrine is essentially a
testimonial to the virtue of hybrid judicial and legislative laws.
The appellate court in Vasquez, however, by turning its
back on the syncretism that has worked, removes the judicial
ingredient. The court essentially cracks open the statute book,
grabs the language that marriage may exist only between a male
and female, and proclaims, "end of story." 249 In so doing, the court
denies its own existence by abrogating the judicial role. It is as if
the court's resistance to homosexuality or fear of it is so potent
that it leads the court to a form of self-annihilation.
In declining to apply marital concepts to same-sex
relationships, the Vasquez appellate court disrespects precedent.
As explained above, the Lindsey and Connell courts discarded the
wooden Creasman approach, which made the law "unpredictable
and at times onerous."250 The Lindsey decision requires courts to
make a just and equitable division after examining the
relationship itself and the accumulations of property. 251 The
Lindsey court purged the analysis of the "rigid set of
requirements," and mandated that each case be examined on its
own facts. 252 In contravention of Lindsey, the Vasquez court
refused to see the facts before it and instead spawned a new
rigidity - heterosexuality - as a requisite for the applicability of
the meretricious doctrine. The court ordered a new threshold
inquiry and said that when the couple fails that heterosexuality
test, the examination can go no further.
The Vasquez court, admitting that Connell does not
"precisely define when a meretricious relationship exists" and that
it requires a "case-by-case" inquiry, stated that "[t]he critical focus
is on property that would have been characterized as community
property had the parties been married."253 The Vasquez court,
however, did not deal with anything it recites - not the case before
it, not the "critical focus," and not the Connell factors. None of

248. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
the meretricious relationship doctrine in Washington).
249. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (One of
the statutory limitations on marriage is that "the parties must be of the opposite
sex...").

250. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984). See supra notes
76-156 and accompanying text (discussing Lindsey and its overruling of Creasman).
251. See Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 331. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying
text.
252. Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 331. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text.
253. Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 242.
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these things came into play.
As explained above, Connell enumerated certain factors
that a court should consider in determining whether there was a
stable marital-like relationship. 254 While the court clarified that
no one factor is controlling and indicated that not all factors need
apply, 255 the Vasquez record reflects that the relationship met
every single prong. In fact, as the trial judge acknowledged, the
showing of a meretricious relationship was so overwhelming that
256
it warranted resolution on summary judgment.
Specifically, Vasquez and Schwerzler had a committed
relationship of long "duration," one that lasted about twenty-eight
of about two years, entailed
years, which, with the exception
"continuous cohabitation." 257 Also,
the "purpose of the
relationship" and the "intent of the parties," as in any other
marriage, had emotional and economic arteries. 258 Vasquez and
Schwerzler appeared together as a couple and described
themselves as "partners."259 They also participated in holidays
260
and significant events as a couple.
The relationship involved the "pooling of resources" and
shared income from "joint projects." 26 1 Together, they bought and
sold apartments and together, they ran a profitable recycling
business. 262 As in other committed relationships, they took the
bitter with the sweet. Their bond endured despite Schwerzler's
gambling problem and its resultant depletion of marital

254. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995). See supra notes 129156 and accompanying text (discussing Connell and its contribution to the
development of the meretricious relationship doctrine).
255. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 834. See supra notes 129-156 and accompanying
text (discussing Connell and its contribution to the development of the meretricious
relationship doctrine).
256. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2000) (discussing the
trial court's determination to grant summary judgment).
257. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 (stating that some of the factors establishing a
meretricious relationship are "duration of the relationship" and "continuous
cohabitation"). See also Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 2-3
(describing the "duration of the relationship" and "continuous cohabitation").
258. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 (stating that other factors establishing a
meretricious relationship are "purpose of the relationship" and "intent of the
parties"). See also Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 2-6 (describing
the relationship between Schwerzler and Vasquez).
259. See Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 3.
260. See id. at 3-4.
261. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 (stating that other factors establishing a
meretricious relationship are "pooling of resources" and "services for joint
projects").
262. See Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 4-5.
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resources. 263 Because the Connell prongs were so adequately
satisfied and left no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court
found as a matter of law that Vasquez was the beneficiary of a
26 4
long term, stable, cohabiting relationship.
While the appellate court eschewed the Connell inquiry, it
deemed the doctrine inapplicable to a situation where the parties
may not legally marry.26 5 The court believed, based on Connell
and its predecessors, that a meretricious relationship may exist
only between a man and a woman. 266 While there are multiple
faults in the reasoning, one of them is the effacement of stare
decisis. What the court was essentially saying is that since the
couples in Connell and other cases were heterosexual, the
decisions can reach only fact patterns with heterosexuals.
Ostensibly, the court's view is that there can never be any
application of extant law to a case that has a new wrinkle that has
not before presented itself. The nonsequitorial premise here is
that the law cannot flex to accommodate change or to be blunt,
that there is no hope of extending law to a case of first impression.
However, the court's interpretation of Connell is skewed for
yet another reason. In Connell, the court felt that not all aspects
of the law governing the distribution of marital property should
apply to meretricious relationships. 267 The reason was freedom of
choice. As the Connell court asserted, the parties chose not to get
married and, therefore, the property that each one owned prior to
the relationship should be unavailable for division. 268 Because of
the conscious decision not to marry, only the property acquired
during the relationship was to be divided. 269 Connell makes it
clear that having the option to marry but not availing oneself of
that option is what creates the limitation and bestows upon the
meretricious relationship a status somewhat "inferior" to legal
marriage.
The Vasquez court, however, inverted Connell. The court,
examining the statutory limitations on who may marry, pointed

263. See id. at 4.
264. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 736 (Wash. 2000) (describing summary
judgment in trial court).
265. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
266. See id. at 242-43.
267. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995). See supra notes
129-156 and accompanying text (discussing Connell and its contribution to the
development of the meretricious relationship doctrine).
268. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 836.
269. See id.
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out that the parties must be of the opposite sex.270 The court then
somehow deduced from Connell that if the parties lack the option
to marry, then the relationship cannot be meretricious.2 7 1 For the
Vasquez court, not availing oneself of marriage because marriage
is not an option becomes not a mere limitation on property
division, but an absolute bar to treatment of the relationship as
meretricious.
An accurate reading of Connell, however, should lead to a
different - and possibly opposite - approach. Specifically, not
having the option to marry should, if anything, expand
entitlement rather than diminish it. The fact that Vasquez and
Schwerzler could not marry should tip the scales not against, but
in favor of, a finding of meretriciousness. Basically, there was
nothing that these committed lovers could do to legalize their bond
or make it more "marital." In contrast, when heterosexual couples
cohabitate and elect not to undergo the legal formalities of
marriage, they are presumed to understand that they might be
relinquishing certain entitlements upon divorce or property rights
if one partner should die without making the other a beneficiary in
a will or trust. 272 Under Connell, being heterosexual demotes the
unmarried couple's rank to "marital-like." 273 According to the
Vasquez appellate court, misreading Connell, being an unmarried
homosexual couple reduces them to the status of virtual strangers.
One of the peculiarities of the Vasquez appellate decision is
274
its extensive harping on the overruled Creasman presumption.
The Vasquez court briefed Creasman, giving the facts and
procedural history, and quoted the key Creasman language that
"in the absence of any evidence [or intent] to the contrary, it
should be presumed as a matter of law that the parties intended to
dispose of the property exactly as they did dispose of it."275 While
the Vasquez court, of course, acknowledges that Lindsey and
Connell rejected Creasman,it ends up treating Creasman as if it
were still good law.
The Vasquez court bolstered its conclusion that a
meretricious relationship can only exist between a man and a
270. See Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
271. See id.
272. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 836 (stating that it does not wish to "ignore ...the
conscious decision by many couples not to marry").
273. See id. C'The parties to such a relationship have chosen not to get married
and therefore the property owned by each party prior to the relationship should not
be before the court for distribution at the end of the relationship.").
274. See Vasquez, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
275. Id. at 242 (quoting Creasman v. Boyle, 196 P.2d 835, 835 (Wash. 1948)).
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woman with reliance on the overruled Creasman decision that
made "repeated reference to 'a man and a woman."' 276 In fact, the
Vasquez court ultimately spawned a Creasman result, one that
equates with the Creasman presumption that as a matter of law
Schwerzler intended to dispose of the property exactly as he did
dispose of it.277 What is interesting here is that a concurring
justice in the Washington Supreme Court praised the appellate
court and said that the "scenario" in the Vasquez case
would be ample reason to reconsider the benefits of the rule
articulated in Creasman ...that property acquired by an
individual, notwithstanding his or her living relationship
short of marriage, in the absence of some trust relationship,
'belongs to the 2one
in whose name the legal title to the
78
property stands.'
The homosexuality in the case motivates the appellate court and
the concurring supreme court justice to the reactionary
resurrection of a well-buried doctrine.
Creasman and Vasquez are kindred spirits in another way.
Both have discrimination coursing through their veins.
The
"unpredictable and at times onerous" 279 application of the
Creasman presumption was born in a case involving an interracial
couple, which must have triggered at a minimum unconscious
280
racial bias and discrimination on the part of that era's judiciary.
As such, it was not unlikely that the presumption derived from a
disinclination on the part of the Creasmanjudges to treat a mixedrace couple as "marital" and deem them entitled to a sharing of
property. In some sense, Creasman can be explained as an antimiscegenation case.
Similarly, Vasquez, with its resuscitation of Creasman,
springs from discrimination as well.
It is based on antihomosexual sentiment and adherence to the irrational notion that
a same-sex relationship cannot be marital or familial. 281 Such a
stereotype in Vasquez is not an anomaly, but rather duplicates the
silly notion that surfaces in other judicial decisions involving gays
and lesbians, especially those that deal with child visitation,
276. See id. at 242 n.2.
277. See Creasman, 196 P.2d at 841.
278. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 741 (Wash. 2000) (quoting Creasman,
196 P.2d at 835).
279. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984).
280. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of

Creasman).
281. See Bottoms, supra note 7, at 345 (discussing how courts create mythic
images of the homosexual, one of them being an individual with a "life-style devoid
of any marital or familial attributes").

2003]

IN THE CLOSET AND IN THE COFFIN
282

custody and adoption.
Courts expressing their heterosexism frequently refrain
283
from attributing family attributes to a homosexual household.
By way of example, there are two notorious homophobic decisions
in Virginia, Doe v. Doe, 284 in which the state supreme court found
that a mother's lesbian relationship did not justify severance of
her parental rights, and Roe v. Roe,28 5 in which the same court
concluded that a father's continuous exposure of his child to his
homosexual relationship made him an improper custodian as a
matter of law. Although the homosexual parent won in Doe and
28 6
lost in Roe, the cases harbor the same discriminatory stereotype.
Both the Doe and Roe courts portray the homosexual parent as
287
immersed in life-styles bereft of any marital or family qualities.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981). In Doe, the married couple divorced and the exhusband remarried. See id. at 801. The ex-husband and his new wife sought to
adopt the child who was living with the ex-wife and her same-sex lover. See id.
The trial court permitted the adoption and severed the lesbian mother's parental
rights, stating,
[The open lesbian relationship now engaged in by Jane Doe, and which
relationship she says will continue, would have a definite detrimental
effect on Jack [the child] if he is permitted to visit and live with his
mother, especially during his formative years and that his being exposed
to this relationship would result in serious emotional and mental harm to
this child, and that his best interest will be promoted by the adoption.
Id. at 804. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and determined that
the trial court's finding was not supported by the evidence. See id. at 806. See also
Bottoms, supra note 7, at 346-49, 352-57 (discussing this case and the court's
portrayal of the lesbian mother as the "malum in se anti-familial criminal").
285. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). In Roe, there was a divorce and the trial court
granted joint legal custody of the child to the mother and the gay father and
specifically found that there was no evidence that the father's lifestyle adversely
affected the child. See id. at 692-94. The trial court, however, required that the
father not share the same bed or bedroom with his lover. See id. at 692. The
Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed and concluded that "[tihe father's
continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship render[ed]
him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law." Id. at 694. See also
Bottoms, supra note 7, at 349-57 (discussing this case and the court's portrayal of
the gay father as the "malum in se anti-familial criminal").
286. See Bottoms, supra note 7, at 352-57 (discussing how both the Doe and Roe
courts "foster the image of the homosexual parent not only as a dangerous criminal,
but also as the personification of the anti-family").
287. In Doe, the heterosexual father portrayed his own home as a "rural extended
family" and juxtaposed it with that of his lesbian ex-wife, which was "different,
unordered, unstructured, and bohemian." 284 S.E.2d at 801. Further, the Doe
court described the dispute before it as one between "two households, one where
there is a husband and wife relationship and the other a homosexual relationship
between two women." Id. at 802. As such, the court implies that the controversy is
not one between human beings but between households, one superior and the other
inferior. In Roe, the court similarly pitted the homosexual household against the
family home as opposites and fixated on the bed and bedroom that his father
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The Vasquez appellate decision falls squarely within this genre,
insisting that the lifestyles of same-sex couples, putatively
characterized by indulgence in sexual promiscuity, are nothing
like their own. 28 s In essence, the judicial process is repression and
denial that stems from some possibly unconscious need on the part
of members of the judiciary to ensure that the homosexual sphere
28 9
has no conceivable affiliation with their own.
At the core of homophobia is an unconscious ligature
between the gay lifestyle and sodomy, 290 which was at issue in the
notorious Bowers v. Hardwick291 decision, upholding the
While the
constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy statute.
Georgia statute itself was gender-neutral, proscribing both
homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, 292 the Bowers Court read it
shared with his male lover. See 324 S.E.2d at 693. See also Bottoms, supra note 7,
at 356-57 (further analyzing the image of anti-family).
288. See Bottoms, supra note 7, at 357 (the homosexual house is presented "not
as a home, but as some orgiastic situs"). In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
Security ClearanceOffice, the court sought to dispel the myth that a gay lifestyle is
one of indulgent sexual promiscuity. 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
The court stated:
Many people erroneously believe that the sexual experience of lesbians and
gay men represents the gratification of purely prurient interests, not the
expression of mutual affection and love. They fail to recognize that gay
people seek and engage in stable, monogamous relationships. Instead, to
many, the very existence of lesbians and gay men is inimical to the family.
Id.
289. See Amathia, supra note 8, at 293-94 (discussing the repression and denial
in homophobic decisions). See also SIGMUND FREUD, Repression (1915) in GENERAL
SELECTION FROM THE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3, 87 (John Rickman ed.
Doubleday 1957) [hereinafter GENERAL SELECTION]. For Freud, "repression lies
simply in the function of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness." Id.
at 89. It works with "negation," which is a "way of taking account of what is
repressed." SIGMUND FREUD, Negation (1925) in GENERAL SELECTION 54-55.
290. See generally Harris M. Miller, II, An Argument for the Application of Equal
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797, 802-803 (1984). Miller states:
and
Sodomy statutes discriminate
against gays
so severely
disproportionately that these statutes are virtually forms of de jure
discrimination.
First, they deny gays all sexual contact, but, for
heterosexuals, at worst only limit the forms of sex in which they may
legally participate. Second, the obvious antigay orientation of the statutes
stigmatizes homosexuals and perpetuates the "sexual deviant" stereotype
of gays. Finally, police, governmental employers, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, university officials, and others defend policies that
discriminate against gays on the basis of the criminal status sodomy
statutes impose upon gays.
Id. See also Scouting, supra note 8, at 62-64 (discussing how sodomy statutes
perpetuate discrimination against gays).
291. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
292. The Georgia criminal statute provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
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as singling out only homosexual conduct.293 What the Bowers
Court did was engraft criminalized conduct onto what it perceived
as a homogenous group - homosexuals. 294
In so doing, it
personified sexual orientation as a menace to a wholesome society.
The Vasquez appellate court decision follows in the
miserable Bowers tradition, by ousting only same-sex unions from
the benefits of the meretricious relationship doctrine. 295 What is
interesting, however, is that "meretricious" once had unsavory
connotations and has evolved into a more generic term referring to
something rather benevolent - that is, a "stable, marital-like
relationship. 296 The Vasquez court, however, yoking the same-sex
union to sodomy, brings back the archaic negativity that was once
linked to meretriciousness.
In declining to affix marital concepts to same sex
relationships, the
Vasquez appellate court dehumanizes
homosexuals by divesting them of the power to choose. This
cruelty is related to, as discussed above, the Vasquez court's
distortion of Connell. In Connell, the court found that freedom of
choice was key and that couples choosing not to marry should
enjoy only some benefits from the law governing the distribution of
marital property. 297
Consequently, heterosexual partners can
assert control over their own lives: they can choose the option of
marriage and get the property rights in accordance with that
station or they can choose a meretricious relationship and have
the property rights befitting that alternative. In short, they have
anus of another ...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one or more than 20 years ...
Id. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-2 (1984)).
293. See Amathia, supra note 8, at 289; Scouting, supra note 8, at 62-63; Cynthia
J. Frost, Shahar v. Bowers: That Girl Just Didn't Have Good Sense, 17 LAw &
INEQ. 57, 62 (1999) ("Equating sodomy with homosexuality has the effect of
exonerating heterosexuals.").
294. See Scouting, supra note 8, at 62-63.
295. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737-38 (Wash. 2000).
296. See deFuria, supra note 37, at 200 n.8 ("[Meretricious' originally connoted
purely illicit and tawdry sexual behavior ('characteristic of a prostitute')") (quoting
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1127 (2d ed. 1989) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 891 (5th
ed. 1979)). DeFuria explains that "conduct once considered unacceptable has now
become relatively commonplace, since few negative connotations apply to the
practice anymore" and that "[a]s the incidence of nonmarital cohabitation
increased, the law began to offer protection to cohabitants against various forms of
discriminatory treatment based upon the meretricious relationship." See deFuria,
supra note 37, at 209. See also Beane, supra note 77 (discussing the evolution of
the doctrine as affording benefits and entitlements).
297. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995). See supra notes
267-273 and accompanying text.
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a menu with more than one selection on it.
The problem with the reasoning in Vasquez is that the court
strips homosexuals of the menu and choices. One choice that is
already foreclosed is marriage, which is barred by Washington
law. 298

The court, however, goes further by sealing up the only

other alternative, that of being recognized as legitimately maritallike.
What the Vasquez court has done in its treatment of these
individuals is mimic the kind of suffocation that psychologists
have called the formula for "learned helplessness." 299 In his
psychological study, Martin Seligman, describes the components of
learned helplessness: "[flirst, an environment in which some
important outcome is beyond control; second, the response of
giving up; and third, the accompanying cognition: the expectation
that no voluntary action can control the outcome." 300 Seligman
conducted experiments with animals subjected to pain that they
Unlike the creatures in
could neither control nor avoid.
Sehgman's comparison group that had a choice of escaping painful
stimuli, the helpless subjects eventually stopped eating or became
limp and apoplectic.

30 1

Conditions that engender learned helplessness are
analogous to the reasoning of the Vasquez court. Essentially, the
Vasquez court has transmitted the message that there is nothing a
homosexual can do to escape the confines of a heterosexist
More than that, the Vasquez decision
property system.
admonishes gays and lesbians that attempting to shape something
so basic to the American value system - home and family - is not

in their control. The Vasquez decision, simulating the laboratory
conditions designed to induce learned helplessness, endorses
uncontrollability and hopelessness for homosexual couples by

298. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)
(discussing statute mandating that married parties be of the opposite sex).
299. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND
DEATH xvii (1992) (discussing "learned helplessness"). See also Amy D. Ronner,
Punishment Meted Out For Acquittals: An AntitherapeuticJurisprudenceAtrocity,
41 ARIZ. L. REV. 459, 479 (1999) (discussing Seligman's studies in the context of the
federal sentencing guidelines and therapeutic jurisprudence).
300. SELIGMAN, supra note 299, at xvii.
301. See id. at 42-43 (describing how uncontrollable shock produced more anxiety
in rats and resulted in the "breakdown of a well-trained appetitive discrimination").
See also id. at 44 ('In summary, helplessness is a disaster for organisms capable of
Three types of disruption are caused by
learning that they are helpless.
uncontrollability in the laboratory: the motivation to respond is sapped, the ability
to perceive success is undermined and emotionality is heightened.").
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urging them to just give up. 30 2
The Vasqtez appellate court's decision is detrimental in yet
another way. It effectually inhibits or, at the very least, fails to
encourage individuals to emerge from the closet. The Connell
court gave factors that help establish the existence of a
meretricious relationship. 303 The factors, such as "continuous
cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the
relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects,
and the intent of the parties," 30 4 are easier to prove when a
relationship is out in the open.
This is especially true in
proceedings involving distribution of property upon death, in
which the surviving partner, the one with the vested interest,
must show a "stable, marital-like relationship." 305 For such an
individual, being able to rely on the testimony of disinterested
parties can be a real plus. Surely, it helps to have third parties
that can relay their observations of the love, sharing and
306
interdependencies between the decedent and the partner.
Consequently, being out of the closet can assure such witnesses
and facilitate a showing of meretriciousness.
Here too the Vasquez appellate court has pushed things in
the wrong direction. In deeming the marital doctrine unavailable
as a matter of law to same-sex couples, the court implicitly
transmits the message that coming out of the closet does not and
cannot help. The court suggests that being open and honest about
one's sexual orientation and holding oneself out as a "stable,
marital-like relationship" 30 7 is unremunerative. As such, the court
has missed an opportunity to create an incentive for same-sex
couples to come out of the closet.
Such a missed opportunity is destructive because, as
discussed above, coming out of the closet is salutary for multiple
reasons. 30 8 It is psychologically beneficial as a means of purging
oneself of societal homophobia. 3 9 Coming out can help individuals
302. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 741 (Wash. 2000).
303. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995); supra notes 129156 (discussing Connell in the context of the evolution of the meretricious
relationship doctrine).
304. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
305. See id.
306. See, e.g., Vasquez Supplemental Brief, supra note 158, at 2-7 (detailing the
Statement of the Facts which relies on record cites to observations of friends and
witnesses, people that interacted with the couple and was aware of their gay
status).
307. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
308. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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come to terms with their own sexual orientation, elevate their self
esteem, and help them lead happier lives. 310 Also, as discussed
above, coming out is politically advantageous because it enables
homosexuals to bond together in the fight for equality. 311 Further,
coming out can change bad attitudes. 3 12 People who are familiar
and interact with minorities are more prone to relinquish
stereotypes and to come to accept people as people. As such,
coming out can yield an antidote to homophobia.3 13 By failing to
encourage outness, the Vasquez decision is not just psychologically
detrimental, but also has the effect of perpetuating discrimination
against homosexuals.
Although the state supreme court reversed and remanded,
that decision does not go far enough. In fact, the majority and
In his
concurring decisions harbor anti-gay sentiment. 314
majority
the
accused
rightly
Sanders
Justice
concurring decision,
of "avoid[ing] meaningful discussion of [the same-sex] issue" and
described the opinion as "provid[ing] somewhat less satisfaction
The majority
that can be obtained from kissing one's sister."315
dwelling
instead
orientation,
of
sexual
issue
the
sidestep
did
mostly on the supposed impropriety of the procedural summary
judgment mechanism. The Supreme Court, filling the paper with
the rehashing of what it saw as the battle of the affidavits, faulted
the merits without
the trial court for resolving the case on
316
information."
factual
undisputed
"sufficient
The majority, however, did not engage in a real critique of
the heterosexist decision below. The court simply stated that the
court of appeals erred by "reach[ing] the merits of the case" and as
guidance on remand, admonished that equitable claims "are not
dependent on the 'legality' of the relationship between the parties,
nor are they limited by gender or sexual orientation of the
parties."3 17 The court did not mention bias or even attempt to
reprove the appellate court for its unfair prejudice and spawning
of different property rights for heterosexuals and for gays. The
Supreme Court seems more agitated by the trial court's supposed
abuse of summary judgment than by the appellate tribunal's cruel
310. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
315. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. 2000) (Sanders, J.,
concurring).
316. Id. at 737.
317. Id. at 736-37.
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discrimination.
Interestingly is that the supreme court makes a point of
building a wall between meretricious relationship and marriage,
emphasizing that the term "marital-like" is only an "analogy
because defining these relationships as related to marriage would
It seems that
create a de facto common-law marriage." 318
underlying the court's insistence that meretricious relationships
are not equivalent to marriage is not just a fear of legitimating
same-sex couples, but also a fear that the decision will one day be
construed that way. The message, although implicit, is that the
court is not condoning homosexual unions and that the decision
should not be treated as a step in the direction of legalizing them.
The majority decision is certainly not courageous; it fails to
provide any real analysis of the failings in the decision below.
Even if the supreme court believed that the facts did not warrant a
summary judgment, it should have at least expounded on the
holding that same-sex relationships can be "marital." The court
simply ducks an opportunity to advance gay and lesbian rights or,
at least, to encourage such individuals to live an open, honest life.
The concurring opinions are worse than that of the
Justice Sanders agreed with the majority that
majority's.
summary judgment in the trial court was inappropriate; he
divorced himself from the majority in several galling ways.
Justice Sanders underscored the fact "that these individuals are of
the same sex," which for him is a distinction with a difference, and
with respect to the meretricious relationship claim "defer[red] to
3 19
the unanimous and thoughtful opinion of the Court of Appeals."
Essentially, Justice Sanders took the view that a same-sex couple
cannot be marital and incorporated into his own perspective the
homophobic attributes of the appellate court's reasoning.
Justice Sanders, however, did not merely rubber-stamp the
appellate decision, as he stated he was inclined to do, but rather
added a toxic layer to it. He packaged his reasoning in the
language of "intent," making it appear that his view had nothing
to do with bias against homosexuals. 320 Sanders posited, like the
court below, that the legal ability to wed is a requirement for a
relationship to be meretricious and hung his hat on the decision in
In re Marriage of Pennington,321 which involved heterosexual
318. Id.
319. Id. at 739 (Sanders, J., concurring).
320. See id. at 740.
321. 14 P.3d 764 (2000). In Pennington, women filed complaints against their
male partners, seeking equitable division of property based on the meretricious
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couples.
Sanders pointed out that certain parties in the
Pennington case lacked the capacity to marry during the period of
cohabitation because they were still married to their prior
spouses. 3 22 Pennington thus bolstered Justice Sander's specious
proposition that the equitable doctrine depends on the "ability of
the couple to make a decision to marry" which he felt bears on
3 23
Connell's intent factor.
Pennington and Vasquez are certainly not kindred spirits.
Essentially, in a heterosexual relationship, where one party is not
still married to a prior spouse, there is an ability to marry the new
lover by choosing to undertake the requisite legal formalities. A
heterosexual relationship in which one party is still married to a
prior spouse is not that much different: the new couple still has
the ability to marry as long as one of the partners chooses to first
proceed with the requisite dissolution of the prior marriage.
Stated otherwise, a heterosexual couple comprised of one alreadymarried partner still can marry, but there is just an additional
legal hurdle. This is nothing like a homosexual relationship in
which the one and only hurdle is insurmountable as a matter of
law. Consequently, the situations are not even comparable.
But the real problem is the controlling Connell analysis that
treats the free choice not to marry as a limitation. 324 Such a
limitation ensues from the fact that the parties to the relationship
chose not to get married and thus, should have to abide by their
choice by relinquishing some benefits attendant to legal marriage.
In short, it is the conscious decision not to avail themselves of a
What Justice
viable option that diminishes entitlement. 325
Sanders failed to acknowledge is that the determinative conscious
decision does not and can not exist in the Vasquez context. If this
means anything, as explained above, it means that Vasquez's
entitlement is greater - not lesser - than that of a couple that has
the ability to marry.
Justice Sanders is not incorrect that the intent factor is a

relationship doctrine. Id. They won in the trial court, but when review was
granted in the Washington Supreme Court, the court held that the evidence did not
establish that either relationship was meretricious. See id. at 773.
322. See Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 740. Specifically, Pennington was married to
someone else for the first five years of his relationship with the woman claiming
that there was a meretricious relationship. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 771.
323. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 740.
324. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995). See notes 129-156
and accompanying text (discussing Connell).
325. See Connell, 898 P.3d at 836 (stating that courts should not ignore "the
conscious decision by many couples not to marry").
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relevant one under Connell, but what he failed to discern is that
the impediment in Pennington bears on the issue of intent while
the impediment in Vasquez does not. A reasonable person could
conceivably conclude that an individual that lives with a lover, but
refuses to divorce a prior spouse does not intend to have a "stable,
marital-like" relationship with the new partner. 326 A reasonable
person, however, could not conceivably conclude that a man that
lives with another man but does not legally marry that individual
does not really intend to have a "stable, marital-like" relationship.
With respect to the gay couple, Sanders' analysis is as absurd as
saying the law should presume one can do the impossible. What
belies his strained use of the inapplicable case is a denial that his
alliance with the court of appeals derives not from reasoning, but
from homophobia and a fear that same-sex couples will gain
societal acceptance.
Another weakness in Justice Sanders' concurrence is his
supposed policy justification. Essentially, he said that if his views
were otherwise, he would be "defeating" the "legitimate
expectations of cohabiting individuals."327 He elaborated that "Mr.
Schwerzler could well have relied upon his expectation that a
meretricious relationship could not possibly exist under the facts
of this case to prompt his decision to cohabit with Mr. Vasquez,
with whom Schwerzler might not have desired to share his
property absent volitional inter vivos transfer of title or
testamentary bequest." 328

The problem here is that the same

could be said of an individual in a heterosexual meretricious
relationship. Such an individual could possibly believe that since
the relationship does not fit the Connell factors, there is no
meretricious relationship and thus, upon death, property would
not pass to the live-in partner. It is also possible that Schwerzler
believed what the Connell court really meant - that because he
could not choose to marry Vasquez, then his property would indeed
3 29
go to his marital-like partner.
What is more perplexing is Justice Sanders' follow-up to the
policy portion of his concurrence. He stated that "by the logic of
the trial court, even if Schwerzler by will had specifically devised
his property to close friends or relatives of his choice, that
326. See Pennington, 14 P.3d at 771. Pennington was married to another woman
while with a new partner. Id. He refused to legally marry the new partner even
after he divorced his wife, evidencing a lack of intent to have a long term

relationship. Id.
327. See Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 741 (Sanders, J., concurring).
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 129-156 and accompanying text (discussing Connelo.
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intention would be defeated as surely as dying intestate by
application of the meretricious relationship doctrine." 330 This
confounds both theory and reality.
The Vasquez decision seems legitimately limited to the
context of intestacy. That is, the posture of the case and the
reasoning of the case suggest that what is being decided is
confined to the situation in which a "stable, marital-like"
relationship exists and one partner dies without a will. It is, of
course, not inconceivable that if in Vasquez the marital doctrine is
deemed to apply to a same-sex relationship, a future litigant might
seek to extend such precedent to some will contest. But isn't that
contingency inherent in all judicial decisions? Any decision might
be deemed applicable to or distinguishable from a new set of facts.
One can always, like Justice Sanders, object to reasoning on the
basis of some case that has not yet reared its head.
Justice Sanders' hypothetical does not ring true for another
reason. While more typically wills naming a same-sex partner as
a beneficiary are vulnerable to contest and thus, invalidation
because of bias, the opposite is rarely the case: be it right or
wrong, the reality is that courts refrain from re-writing a will,
especially one leaving property to someone deemed to be a natural
object of the decedent's bounty. 331 In short, Sanders sees a
problem where it does not in reality exist.
Ironically, Sanders aligned his view with the goal of
testamentary freedom, implying that the allowance of same-sex
meretricious relationships could "deny each of these partners the
opportunity to dispose of his entitled assets as each saw fit, even
upon demise." 332 The problem here is that the Lindsey-Connell
inquiry is tailored to respect testamentary freedom through
ascertaining the decedent's intent and ensuring that assets go
their intended way.3 33 Justice Sanders himself admitted that
"intent" is an important part of the Connell inquiry. In fact, the
equitable doctrine assists courts in finding the real - not just the
statutorily presumed - intent of the partner with title.
In the concurring opinion, Chief Justice Alexander agreed
with Justice Sanders that the meretricious relationship doctrine
should not apply when one of the partners is deceased, but only

330. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 741 (Sanders, J., concurring).
331. See supra notes 37-42 (discussing will contests when beneficiaries are samesex partners or even "non-family" members).
332. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 741 (Sanders, J., concurring).
333. See supra notes 76-156 (discussing the evolution of the mereticious
relationship doctrine).
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when a couple separates. 334 The Chief Justice would "leave to
another day" the question of whether the doctrine applies to a
stable same-sex couple in a long-term relationship that breaks
up. 335 Consequently, what he advocates is complete avoidance of
While Justice Sanders
the homosexuality element entirely.
wanted to return to the reign of Creasman, Chief Justice
Alexander desired stasis or putting the law at a stand still. Either
approach, however, encourages the closet and transmits the
message that there is no benefit to being open about one's samesex love.
CONCLUSION
As discussed in Part I, a homosexual's emergence from the
closet is courageous and significant. 336 It also brings psychological
benefits by elevating self esteem and helping individuals lead
The coming out process is also
healthy and happy lives. 337
politically empowering because it enables individuals to bond
together in the fight for equality. 338 Not only that, being open
about one's identity can improve our culture. 339 Specifically,
individuals interacting with homosexuals are more prone to accept
340
others, discarding stereotypes and negative predilections.
Decisions, like that in Vasquez, are psychologically, politically and
culturally damaging because they transmit a message that the
safest place to stay is in hiding and that there is nothing to be
gained by being open about one's love.
When the Vasquez appellate decision issued, Daniel B.
Kennedy, a reporter for the ABA Journal, asked family law
professor David Meyer what "practical lesson" the case provides
for gay and lesbian couples. 341 Responding, Professor Meyer
advised, "[mlemorialize your intentions as clearly as possible in
writing so you don't have to rely on equitable doctrines and default
rules" and explained, "[a]s the [Vasquez] case shows, those sorts of
342
equitable doctrines can be applied inequitably."

334. See Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 738 (Alexander, C.J., concurring).
335. See id.
336. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
340. See supranotes 34-35 and accompanying text.
341. Daniel B. Kennedy, Til Death Do Us Part: Same-Sex Survivor Seeks Assets of
Partner UnderEquitable Doctrine Governing Heterosexuals,ABA J. 22 (Jan. 2001).
342. Id.
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The problem here is that for same-sex couples,
memorializing intentions in writing is not foolproof either. As
pointed out in Part I, lawyers engaged in estate planning for samesex couples know that a will naming a lover as a beneficiary is
especially vulnerable to a contest. The couple's lifestyle and
decedent's openness about his or her homosexuality can affect a
343
family member's decision to wage war to invalidate the will.
Sometimes, it is the secrecy of the decedent that antagonizes
family members and sparks the conflict. Other times, it is the
decedent's candor that engenders animosity and prompts
heterosexist family members to challenge the estate plan. As
such, for lesbians and gays, dying with a will is surely not a sure
thing. It does not ensure that a court will honor the decedent's
donative intent or adhere to the policy favoring testamentary
freedom.
As explained in Part II, dying without a will can also be
pretty hopeless. While statutes provide for surviving spouses, they
do not contain equivalent accommodations for unmarried
partners. 344 That is, the survivor in a same-sex union can not
claim an elective share or the spousal intestate share. 345 Such a
survivor must rely on judicial constructs, equitable concepts, like
meretricious relationship doctrine. 346 What decisions, like that in
Vasquez, admonish is that judicial bias against homosexuals can
347
make those svelte equitable loopholes unavailable.
As suggested in Part II, it is the homophobia in Vasquez
that prompts the appellate court to ignore significant policies
behind the intestacy laws and trample upon precedent. 348 It is the
homophobia in Vasquez that similarly infects the decisions in the
supreme court that do little to dispel cruel stereotypes against
gays and in fact, even perpetuates them.
Decisions like Vasquez are devastating. They dehumanize
homosexuals by divesting them of the power to choose. Unmarried
homosexual couples, unlike their heterosexual counterparts, lack

343. See supra notes 26-62 and accompanying text (discussing the affects of
coming out on homosexuals and how some remain closeted due to the confines of
legal doctines).
344. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 76-156 and accompanying text (discussing the meretricious
relationship doctrine).
347. See supra notes 203-335 and accompanying text (analyzing the homophobia
in the Vasquez appellate court decision and also in the Washington Supreme
Court).
348. See supra notes 203-335 and accompanying text.
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the ability to make choices that affect the distribution of their
property. That is, they lack the option of selecting a lifestyle that
can trigger entitlement to any of the benefits attendant to the
marital relationship. They are, as pointed out in Part II, treated
as "learned helpless," effectually divested of control over
significant facets of their lives. 349 They are encouraged to stay
hidden, to contain what Bosie called that kind of "love that dare
350
not speak its name."
Religious theorists, philosophers, psychologists, and artists
all pay homage to love, the most powerful benevolence in the
universe. By way of example, one of the great Romantic poets,
Percy Bysshe Shelley, called love "the bond and the sanction which
connects not only man with man, but with everything which
exists."3 51 What makes homophobic decisions so dreadful is that
they impugn and silence love. We, as a society should want to
have all species of love not merely speaking, but actually shouting

its name.
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349. See supranotes 299-301 and accompanying text.
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